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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction i.s premised upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES WITH STANDARD 01 Al'PELLA I'K REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: DID THE COURT ERR BY FAILING TO BASE ITS 
VALUATION OF STOCK SHARES ON THE INVESTMENT 
VALUE OF THE COMPANY? 
<„)uesln mil Mfiiloi\ interpretation leviewed for correctness. ^<~ 
;.^n v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 
P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 10<n 
that the valuation should be based on the investment value of the company and not based 
upon alleged breach of fiduciary duty unrelated to the merger, and moved to exclude such 
evidence. ' " " I „' | | i i i i |,,,i||i i» i i |h | i, , |Vfni,!.ii , 
SS-1(><V riaintiff's Motion m Limine to Exclude Evidence of Breach 
ol Edueiarv Dui\ < mrelated to the Merger (R. v '2). Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
^aihinai v Judgment (R. t> 
Determinati1 Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330: Oakrid.se Energy Inc. v. 
Clifton, 937 P.2u • •
 v IM7); Hogle v. Zinetics Medical. Inc., t>> P .So 8U Cl'iah 
MY1). 
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ISSUE NO. 2: DID THE COURT IMPROPERLY RELY ON EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE LEASE AND TO 
DISREGARD KENNECOTT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE 
MINING LEASE? 
Common law interpretation reviewed for correctness. Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 
P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court in that appellant argued to the trial court 
that the unambiguous terms of the integrated lease allowed Kennecott to mine the surface 
of the New Bingham claims, and moved to exclude extrinsic evidence. R. 1194 at pp. 
376-379; Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude the Introduction of Extrinsic Evidence 
to Interpret the 1979 Lease (R. 1040-1042). 
Determinative Law: Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Div. of State Lands and 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990); Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). 
ISSUE NO. 3 DID THE COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT AN ARM'S 
LENGTH NEGOTIATION WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN 
COMPENSATION TO NEW BINGHAM IN THE AMOUNT 
OF $36 MILLION DOLLARS, AN AMOUNT FAR ABOVE 
WHAT KENNECOTT HAD PAID AND ANACONDA HAD 
ACCEPTED FOR THIS PARCEL AND 12,000 ADDITIONAL 
ACRES TWO YEARS EARLIER? 
Mixed question of law and fact, factual questions being reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. See Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, 119 S.Ct. 1803 (1999). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court in that appellant argued to the trial court 
that the evidence will not support speculation that such a negotiation would have resulted 
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in such an enormous payment. R. 1194 at p. 379-380; Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. 615-617). 
Determinative law: Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983). 
ISSUE NO, 4: DID THE COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THEIR 
LEGAL CLAIMS AND THAT THEIR CLAIMS WERE 
THEREFORE NOT BARRED? 
Mixed question of law and fact, factual questions being reviewed under clearly 
erroneous standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. See Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, 119 S.Ct. 1803 (1999). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court in that appellant argued to the trial court 
that appellees were advised by their own legal counsel and had notice of their legal 
claims and failed to raise them. R. 1194 at pp. 368-374; Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. 615-617). 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27; Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas. and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997); Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Or. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330(1) to determine the 
"fair value" of the stock of a company which was merged into another. The appellees 
("Groesbecks") owned 3.8% of the company and were paid approximately $40,000 for 
their shares in the merger based on a total value for the company of approximately $1 
million. The Groesbecks dissented from the merger, which led to this statutory valuation 
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proceeding. The matter was tried to the bench resulting in a judgment for Groesbecks for 
compensation above that which they had previously been paid in the amount of over 
$1,325 million (based on a total company value of $36 million), to which interest was 
added for a total judgment of over $2 million. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
New Bingham Mary Mining Company ("New Bingham") was incorporated in 
1929. A predecessor to the Groesbecks was one of the original shareholders. Finding of 
Fact no. 2, R. 1141. The company's sole assets were two adjacent mining claims 
purchased at that time for $10,000, occupying approximately 16 acres in the Oquirrh 
Mountains of Utah. Ex. 1 at Article XVII. From the time the company was incorporated 
until 1979 there is no evidence that the company had any operations or income. R. 1193, 
pp. 239-240. 
Over time a majority interest in New Bingham was acquired by The Anaconda 
Company ("Anaconda"). Anaconda itself owned thousands of acres in the Oquirrh 
Mountains surrounding the New Bingham claims and adjacent to the western edge of the 
Kennecott Corporation mining properties. See Ex. 26 (aerial photo in addendum to this 
brief). In the late 1970's Anaconda proposed to develop an underground copper mine in 
the vicinity of the New Bingham claims called the Carr Fork Mine, and in 1979 
Anaconda and New Bingham entered into a mining lease by which New Bingham 
granted Anaconda the right to conduct mining operations on the New Bingham claims. 
Ex. 2, 3 (in addendum to this brief). In return New Bingham would receive an immediate 
cash payment of $5,000, minimum advance royalty payments of $25,000 per year, plus a 
583050.1 4 
production royalty of 3% of net returns on all minerals removed from the property. At 
the meeting of the shareholders of New Bingham held to vote on the mining lease, the 
Groesbecks appeared with their lawyer and argued against approval of the lease for a 
number of reasons including that they did not believe the royalty amount was sufficient. 
Notwithstanding the Groesbecks' protests the lease was approved by a majority vote of 
the shareholders, including minority shareholders. Ex. 2. 
Anaconda operated its mine for approximately two years from fall of 1979 to fall 
of 1981 before shutting it down, never to reopen, because it was uneconomical. Ex. 8; 
R.1192, pp. 91-93. 
The Groesbecks and their attorneys were vigilant about monitoring the activities 
of Anaconda and New Bingham. On April 9, 1982, for example, Groesbecks through 
their counsel complained to Anaconda that New Bingham shareholders were not 
receiving appropriate accountings. They alleged that "minority shareholders have 
substantial rights which have been disregarded," and that the Groesbecks had researched 
records at the State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, to determine that Anaconda had been mining ore from the New Bingham 
properties. Ex. 5. 
Groesbecks attended a New Bingham shareholder meeting on April 14, 1982 at 
which, according to the minutes, "[a] discussion was held regarding the future of the 
Company" and the future of Anaconda's Carr Fork Mine. Ex. 6. 
In approximately May, 1982 New Bingham paid a dividend to shareholders 
including the Groesbecks. In correspondence explaining the dividend, shareholders were 
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advised of the mining that had taken place pursuant to the lease and of the royalty 
calculation that led to the dividend. Ex. 8. 
After the Carr Fork Mine was closed down in November of 1981 (Ex. 8) the New 
Bingham property returned to dormancy. The company had no means to mine its own 
claims, and indeed the claims were surrounded by the properties owned by Anaconda and 
Kennecott Corporation ("Kennecott") properties. New Bingham was dependent on an 
adjoining large mining operation to mine the New Bingham claims. R. 1192, pp. 122-
123. 
The Anaconda and Kennecott properties adjoined one another. The two 
companies for years had explored ways in which they might collaborate. Both were 
familiar with one another's operations. R. 1192, p. 90. Anaconda owned the property 
west of Kennecott's Bingham Canyon open pit mine, but Kennecott owned the mineral 
rights. In order for Kennecott to access its minerals it would have to expand its mine 
onto the surface owned by Anaconda. R. 1192, p. 87. Kennecott had studied the value to 
Kennecott of having access to Anaconda's property and determined that under certain 
assumptions, such access could potentially result in hundreds of millions of dollars, or 
even billions of dollars in revenue to Kennecott. Ex. 101, 102; R.1193, pp. 160-170. 
Despite the potential benefit to Kennecott, Kennecott and Anaconda never struck a deal 
for any sort of a collaborative effort, and Kennecott never even considered offering 
Anaconda the kind of values reflected in Kennecott's studies. R. 1192, p. 104. 
In 1985 Anaconda sold all of its assets in the Oquirrh Mountains to Kennecott for 
$5 million. The sale included over 12,000 acres of real property, hundreds of patented 
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and unpatented mining claims, water rights, mining equipment and a majority interest in 
the shares of two companies, one of which was New Bingham. Ex 9 I lad tl ic f ull $5 
would imply a total company value of about $5.8 million or about 1/6 of the $36 million 
value placed on New Bingham by the court below (This would mean that the otl ler 
L!,U0(t auev tin linlmj1 .11 h i p .HIM < 1 tin MINI, nl K a m a nil |ni kWir ban^i sold lm 
free!). The Anaconda sale was an arm's length transaction by two rational economic 
actors, both sophisticated mining companies. Anaconda was owned by the Atlantic 
Richfield Company. ~Ast.Ii i g :>i it of tl le i i lii lii lg 
^>perties, it was iiut uudei auy duress and there is no 
reason to believe it sold the assets for anything less than what Anaconda believed it could 
obtain for them. D 1192, pp. t o c f . 
•
 %
 * an" "l"i»l .illei" ihc iissef purchase 
was to pay to shareholders, including Groesbecks, a dividend that had been declared prior 
to the sale, R 1124; 1192, p. 110 
I N n v i i i i i j l i . i n i In Hill mi iiiir.l \ i t n i r i i t i l i l a M K V I H I I 1 I n III I I VMI I in • Ih i i v s e t ( n i i t l i ; i \ r I n 
Kennecott on August 28, 1986. At ihc Lime there were approximately 65 minority 
shareholders ™ 1irk^ - 1 1 1 The New Bingham management was made up of 
Kenna iiHlll cm] • ' (In1 rinplovcvs ^lin m n nilTirci1, m i In a inns i i, 
employed by Kennecott by the time of trial, other than an assistant secretary. R. i 192, 
pp. 109-110 The Groesbecks attended the 1986 meeting with their counsel. Although 
two witnesses who attended the meeting testified aboi it it at trial, tl le i ecoi d • :)f 
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transpired at the meeting consisted largely of the minutes of the meeting (Ex. 11) and 
some handwritten notes of one of the attendees at the meeting who was not available at 
trial. Ex. 12. 
One issue discussed at the meeting was a change in one of the Articles of 
Incorporation, Article VII. It was presented and voted on by the shareholders, all of 
whom voted in favor except the Groesbecks, who spoke against it through their attorney, 
and voted against it. R. 1192, p. 113; Ex. 11, Ex. 12. 
After the meeting an informal question and answer period took place. Among the 
matters discussed was whether Kennecott had all of Anaconda's records, and "gaps" in 
the information due to the lack of Anaconda people to talk to. Ex. 12. The group passed 
around and discussed a handwritten draft of a financial statement for the company, and 
the income and assets reflected. Id. The notes also reflect Clay Groesbeck, the son of 
appellee Robert Groesbeck, asking, "what would be the involvement of the two claims 
with 1. open pit, 2. U.G. [underground]." The notes show New Bingham management 
responding as follows: 
1. U.G. - removal of ore in the past from these claims as 
far as I know. 
2. Will mine across the claims for waste removal and 
construction of the roads. 
Ex. 12 (Emphasis added.) The notes also reflect an unidentified individual asking, 
"[fjuture would the ore be mined by open pit?," and receiving the response "[p]robably 
not in near future [illegible] at depth-high cost." Id. The meeting was cordial and 
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friendly. ... .--:_,
 r Neither the Groesbecks nor any other shareholder expressed 
any objection to Kennecott's plan to mine across the claims. Id., p 126 
1 1 ie da) af te i tl ie shai et loldei i i leetii ig ti le Groesbecks it iroi lgl i coi n tsel, wrote to 
Kennecott to sa> the> had enjoyed the meeting with the Kennecott representative and 
discussing the company with him. Groesbecks also requested the opportunity to examine 
the books and records of tl :tc: • c t:>i i lpai t> E c 13; R 1193. pp 130 131 1 1 lei e f : ilk we d a 
series < i
 i e t ters and meetings in which the Groesbecks and their counsel were provided 
with records of the company and met personally with representatives of Kennecott and 
New Bingham. ; i :
 r u . ,iu, 
location . Lx. i / , R. 1193, p . i J 3 . Additionally, 
in response to their request "to see the present mining situation and how it relates to the 
New Bingham Mary Mining property" (Ex. 1-J roesbecks were given the n a r 
telephoi ie in lmbei of tl ie Kei n lecott i:i in te i i; * * •• .•• " personally inspect the 
New Bingham property. The Groesbecks knew the mine manager because they had met 
him at the 1986 shareholder meeting. R. 1193, p. Despite the opportunity to do so 
mi1 i i i o c s b e c k s in > i i ,n i II ,M n u n m ,u u i y M i h s n j u o i i t ( l i n e \ i s i l o l l l n 1 | i M i p c i i i i\ 
1193, pp. 255-256. Neither did they ever even go to the Kennecott visitors center, which 
is open to the public, and which affords a view of the entire pit including the area of the 
N r w B i i i g k t i u I ' l ' i i ' t i 1 ' ! L I , \\\ , l ) l ' ' I l l l l l iII!f! , I M I I I 1 I i l i r \ v • n n l u i ^ s < u \\ n \ 
other time, did the Groesbecks or their counsel object to Kennecott's plans, ever suggest 
that New Bingham was entitled to additional compensation beyond that called for by the 
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lease, or ever express any interest in participating in the management of New Bingham. 
R. 1193, p. 136. 
Consistent with the advice given in the 1986 shareholder meeting, Kennecott, in 
1989, began mining across the surface of the New Bingham claims and other and larger 
ground acquired from Anaconda for the removal of waste. R. 1193, p. 135; Ex. 26. The 
process of removing the waste or overburden in a surface mining operation is sometimes 
referred to as "stripping." R. 1192, p. 82. In order to mine on the surface you have to 
strip the surface. R. 1194, p. 344. The distinction between overburden and ore is an 
economic one. Id., p. 81. When material excavated contains sufficient quantities and 
concentrations of minerals that it is economical to process it, the material is classified as 
ore. If the material is not economical it is referred to as overburden and it is sent to the 
waste dump. Id., p. 82. 
In October of 1992 another shareholder meeting was held at which Kennecott's 
mine plans were discussed in some detail. The Groesbecks attended. The only written 
record of the meeting is the meeting minutes. Ex. 22. The minutes reflect that "Robert 
Groesbeck, a stockholder, asked what had happened to the property." In response, "Mr. 
Orchow indicated that in the current Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation mine plan there 
is 4.7 million tons of possible ore over the next twenty year period. There are 2 million 
tons contemplated for the year 2002." Id. The shareholders were also reminded that 
Kennecott was paying New Bingham $25,000 per year in advance royalties. Id. One of 
the shareholders asked if there was a current mining plan available to look at. In 
response, "Mr. Orchow said there was not. In the 1995-1996 period Kennecott Utah 
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Copper Corporation is looking at 135 [thousand] tons <>f ore mined from this property, 
with the year 2002 being the big year with 2 million tons of or-- -
in the Oquirrh 
Mountains above and around the open pit." Another shareholder asked if a topical map 
was available and was advised that "one was available and woi lid be sen* *o all 
Groesbecks, or any suggestion that Kennecott did not have the right to mine the claims. 
R 1193, pp. 140-141. 
Kennecott encountered oi e oi i tl le I fev Bh lghai i i claii i is ii i 1/995, ai id agaii I ii i 
1996 j,4, Ex. 23. Additional ore was scheduled to be removed from the 




* determination was made to merge New Bingham \i ff 
limy- • \ in ('onip.iny, >.i • .*»y of Kennecott, An 
appraisal was commissioned to determine the value of the stock. The appraiser first 
looked at market value based on stock sales. Over the years Kennecott had acquired 
shaii.11 nl New iliiifiliniiiii '.I i I ill 'In 'ill |in "ili.iii1 imill llif appi nsn tlilcniiinnl ill'liui'l1 Ihr 
market sales data was not helpful. R. 1192, pp. 18-1: 1: then focused on valuing the 
underlying asset of the company, which was its real estate id. He examined some 
cotiipaiiablr saks ol tral rslali' mi'lmlm" llu l9K"n Ana* nndn sale nllecfiiijt; a puce pi*i 
acre of $500, but ultimately determined that the best way to approach valuation would be 
the income approach, that is, to value the income stream under the mining lease using a 
583050a 11 
from Kennecott's mining group, as is customary in his profession, determined the ore that 
would be mined from the New Bingham claims over the life of the Bingham Canyon 
mine. R. 1192, pp. 24-25. He then calculated the annual advance and production 
royalties that would be paid based on those mining projections and reduced the resulting 
stream of revenues to present value. Ex. 23. To that figure he added the cash held by 
New Bingham and concluded that the company had a value of $1,072,000, or $1.10 per 
share. Pursuant to the appraisal, the Groesbecks were entitled to the payment of a total of 
$40,480. Ex. 23. The merger was approved by a vote of all minority shareholders, who 
also accepted the appraisal of $1.10 per share, with the exception of the Groesbecks. The 
Groesbecks objected to the value and pursuant to Utah statutory law, Bingham 
Consolidation Company filed the instant litigation to obtain a judicial determination of 
the value of the company. 
At trial the expert retained by the Groesbecks rendered the opinion that the 
company was worth $36,039,6745, or $37.11 per share. The opinion was based upon a 
two part analysis. Groesbecks' expert first determined the investment value of the 
company using the same methodology as employed by the original appraiser. R. 1194, 
p. 349; Ex. 126. Groesbecks' expert agreed that the investment approach was the 
appropriate way to evaluate New Bingham. R. 1194, pp. 348-349. The investment value 
of the company as determined by Groesbecks' expert was $3.50 per share, the difference 
from appellant's appraisal being attributable to different copper prices and discount rate, 
and the addition of the potential for some underground reserves. Ex. 126. In a second 
part to his analysis, Groesbecks' expert calculated the value of the ore available to 
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Kennecott on Kennecott's own claims made accessible by the incorporation of the New 
Bingham claims into the Bingham Canyon pit. R. 1194 p ^<n The expert then opined 
that a fair value for Kennecott to paj f or tl lat j a r s s , <u 
New Bingham I« i that access, would be an additional $33.61 per share above and beyond 
the investment value. Groesbeck's expert specifically refrained, however, from rendering 
the opinion that Kennecott would have agreed to paj till lat ai i ic lit it if a i legotiatioi i I  lad 
in i inn ii h r h u r n 'I I in it .r ill'11 n (utiiits ¥ I I'M pp. 343-344. The expert also specifically 
did not consider the Anaconda sale to Kennecott in his opinion (Id., p.348), in which this 
very same property, plus many, many more acres also destined to be incorporated into 
k c c n i Q o n " > IIIIIII, , \ u n , " MIII.1 i i i i .ii f*i «ii in III til1 (lii Mtini,' In* vv.n a s s i g n i n g l o i lk p i o p o r l v . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. h :\\ the shares of New Bingham should K„ been evaluated based iqiuii 
i me mci&ci, tiiat is, a discounted cash flow 
analysis of the company's revenues under the mining lease. The court erred by awarding, 
in addition to the investment value, an amount of money an order of magnitude larger 
u ; f i l V M l t i t l i l g J ( n n t u l , i ; t i if ilu h c i i t i i i in K I ' I I I K H U M h\ [ i i i i \ i i i f i ai i. T'S'S i n ifit1 N e w 
Bingham claims. The court did so on the theory that, had New Bingham's management 
not breached fiduciary duties owed to the minority shareholders, the company would 
l i . n r I ' V U M a J III.it . i i i i 'Minl r i u n i f y i i i . i nv y r m s . i f n 
2. Kennecott had the right to mine the surface of the New Bingham claims, a 
conclusion with which the court agreed. The court erred by concluding that the lease did 
not allow Kennecoll ih niini, llim s u r h u ' i , ' nil il ic IMIn • t n i l l ic i n i m u v 
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purpose of benefiting Kennecott's own mining operations. The lease makes no such 
distinction, and no mining company would have agreed to mine the New Bingham claims 
unless it was a benefit to the larger operation. The court arrived at its interpretation by 
erroneously considering evidence extraneous to the integrated, unambiguous lease. 
3. In order to arrive at its evaluation, the court speculated that impartial 
managers of New Bingham would have elected to terminate the lease due to Kennecott's 
inadvertent failure to obtain written consent prior to assignment of the lease, that 
Kennecott would thereafter have agreed to negotiate a new lease with New Bingham and 
that, in that negotiation, Kennecott would have agreed to pay New Bingham $36 million 
for a new lease. The court's conclusion is speculative and contrary to the evidence. 
4. The court erred by concluding that the Groesbecks did not have notice of 
the claims they now assert. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence that for 15 years 
prior to the time they ever asserted their claims the Groesbecks and their counsel had 
sufficient information to at the very least put them on inquiry notice of the claims they 
now assert. 
ARGUMENT 
The award in this case of $1,325 million for Groesbecks' 3.8% minority interest 
assigns a value to New Bingham as a whole of over $36 million dollars. The contrast 
between this value and its value as suggested by the 1985 transaction between Kennecott 
and Anaconda, two sophisticated mining companies acting rationally and in their own 
best economic interests in an arms-length transaction, is shocking. In 1985 Kennecott 
paid $5 million dollars not only for 86% of New Bingham, but also for many acres of 
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additional real estate (many times the size of the New Bingham acreage) destined, like 
the New Bingham claims, to be incorporated into the Binghai.. * anvon mine, plus a 
mine, mining equipment, mining claims, water rights, etc. Indeed, evaluations based 
solely on the income stream and assets of New Bingham made by the experts in (his 
litigation yielded a \ • all le • :)f $1 i i i illioi :t fc • th = "I: i :: li i cc n ipai IJ i ,sii lg appellai if" s 
assumptions (just $40,000 for Groesbecks ' 3.8%), and $3.4 million using Groesbecks ' 
assumptions ($129,000 for 3.8%). The reason the award iii this case escalated so 
dramatically over tlle value produced by conventional valuation 
nnip.niv!'!!,! \\\\\\ !!•„" AII.I, \*vA\ \i\\v i\ tli.il the trial coui t improperly reviewed the past 
management of the company and effectively awarded damages for alleged past breach of 
fiduciary duty, ignored Kennecot t ' s rights under the mining lease, and failed to apply to 
tl le Gi oesbecks tl ite si: id c oi i i it i ion la1* \ defenses v hicl I pi ecli ide stale claims. 
R A T H E R T H A N B A S I N G ITS D E T E R M I N A T I O N O N T H E 
I N V E S T M E N T V A L U E O F T H E C O M P A N Y , T H E C O U R T A W A R D E D 
D A M A G E S F O R B R E A C H OF F I D U C I A R Y D U T Y A L L E G E D L Y 
C O M M I T T E D Y E A R S EARLIER, 
Utah law contemplates that a shareholder will be paid what his shares are worth, 
that is, what a rational person would pay for them at the time of the merger. That did not 
happni in IIIL> i .ii i M mi I in in iin m i l * i nun i n i n v u l iiiin manajiomnii nl Ni'V HiniPli nil 
over tiiv i j jCaiS or so prior to the merger and effectively awarded what .. „.
 0:„ 
damages should have been had the Groesbecks brought a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary 
duty years earlier. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330(1) provides that if a shareholder demands payment 
beyond the value determined by the corporation for his shares, litigation will be instituted 
"to determine the fair value of the shares ...." "Fair value," in turn, is defined as "the 
value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which 
the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the 
corporate action." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1301 (4). 
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed that the three most recognized and 
relevant elements of fair value for valuation of stock under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
1330 are (1) investment value (discounted cash flow), (2) market value or (3) asset value. 
Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton 937 P.2d 130,132 (Utah 1997); Hogle v. Zinetics 
Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80 (Utah 2002). Of those methods courts have traditionally 
favored investment value. Oakridge 937 P.2d at 33; Hogle 63, P.3d at 88. Appellant's 
appraiser appropriately considered market value and asset value approaches, before 
settling on an investment value approach. It is the investment value methodology which 
appellant used to arrive at its value of $1.10 per share, and that the Groesbecks' expert 
used to arrive at his value of $3.50 per share. Although Groesbecks' value differs from 
the value determined by appellant because of differing assumptions, the two are based on 
the same permissible methodology and are calculated to fairly replace the value the 
shareholders lost on the day of the merger. 
The trial court, however, went beyond any methodology approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court designed to replace the value to the shareholders, and instead awarded 
what can only be described as a windfall to Groesbecks. 
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First, the trial court based its determination not on the value of New Bingham but 
on the presumed value of the benefit to appellant's parent, Kenneu 
nili ill! Nru HIIIMIUIII I IILIJIIJI, mil iiiimiiniliiir pinjHTI mini mining its own ore on its 
own land. In doing so the court, among other things, violated the holdings of Oakridge 
Energy and Hogle in which the Utah Supreme Court expressly stated that the fair value of 
minority shares is in I iilrtniiiiiiiicili by llu hem iiii i Dftnrnj liny 11u* sun IVMI" nirpuiiiiuui 
Courts have made it clear, however, that '""fair value" is not 
measured by any unique benefits that will accrue to ilit 
acquiring corporation, any more than the compensable value 
of property taken by eminent domain is measured by its 
special value to the condemned'" (citing Oakridge Energy). 
Hogle v. Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 85 (Utah 2002). The Court continued: 
[t]he appraisal proceeding is not at all concerned with the 
losses to the particular dissenting shareholders or with the 
benefits derived by the particular acquiring corporation in the 
merger, except as these losses and benefits would be reflected 
in the price that would be bargained out in any completely 
free market between any willing buyer and any willing seller 
in the absence of the merger. 
hi, iciimg In re valuation of Common Stock of Libfo , McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 
62 (Me. 1979)). 
Further, the trial court's determination was not based upon valuu Bingham 
possessed "immuliah'h hdnnn llu; cllccni iliuii Il llln I inn i»ri 1 M I nul on value which 
New Bingham and the minority shareholders, according to the trial court, should have 
received from Kennecott years earlier. But this scenario never occurred at all, and had it 
oiciiiiul in wniiilil In hi mruiiu'l nun h iiiilin ih.i "inmuNlialHv before11 llir i 
required by Utah's merger statute, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1301(4). 
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Finally, the trial court's valuation amounts to an award of damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty arising from events which occurred many years prior to the merger, a 
claim never asserted during the life of the corporation. The court was led to do so by 
decisions from selected jurisdictions other than Utah in which evidence of breach of 
fiduciary duty was considered by the court and influenced the determination. See, e.g., 
Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim at p. 3, R. 1137 
("Memorandum Decision"), citing Fleming v. International Pizza Supply Corp., 676 
NJE.2dl051, 1057 (Ind. 1997). 
In response to the complaint filed by appellant as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10a-1330(1), Groesbecks filed a counterclaim for compensatory and punitive 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim which the court granted, holding that the statutory appraisal procedure is the 
exclusive remedy available to a shareholder in these circumstances. The court went on to 
say, however, that it would "allow the Groesbecks to provide evidence of the alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty in order to assist the Court in determining what value that [sic] 
should be assigned to the shares at the time of the merger." R. 1137-1140. It is obvious 
from its judgment, however, that the trial court effectively overruled its own 
Memorandum Decision and awarded damages for breach of fiduciary duty after all. 
In its Memorandum Decision the trial court interpreted Fleming to allow 
consideration of breach of fiduciary duty claims in a statutory appraisal proceeding. 
What the court failed to note when interpreting Fleming, however, was that the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims in Fleming involved events directly surrounding the merger itself. 
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There the dissenting minority shareholder raised the breach of fiduciary duty claims in 
litigation immediately following the transaction in which the majority shareholder voted 
in favor of selling substantially all of the company's assets to a new corporation.1 
Fleming 676 N.E.2d at 1052. The Fleming court allowed evidence of alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty in the appraisal action but in Fleming the actions in question were 
contemporaneous and affected the value of the shares at the time of the transaction. 
Fleming 676 N.E.2d at 1058. In contrast the Groesbecks point to breach of fiduciary duty 
that allegedly occurred years ago, a claim never raised by them during the life of the 
company. Their allegations are unrelated in time and impact to the merger itself. The 
trial court's reliance on Fleming to allow consideration of breach of fiduciary duty in the 
current appraisal action was incorrect. 
Other state courts have not uniformly agreed even to consider evidence of breach 
of fiduciary duty in these circumstances. For example, in SIEG Company v. Kelly, 568 
1
 The timeline of events surrounding the litigation in Fleming was as follows: October 
1988, Fleming (minority shareholder) and Jensen (majority shareholder) form 
International Pizza Supply Corporation ("International Corp"); May 1989, Jensen, 
Fleming and International Corp enter into a buy-sell agreement whereby a minimum 
price for Fleming's shares was set at $150,000 (an amendment increased the amount to 
$300,000); December 1990, Jensen enters into agreement to sell assets of International 
Pizza Supply Corporation to a new company, International Pizza Supply Company, Inc. 
("IPS Co."); February 8, 1991, Jensen and his wife conduct meeting of the board of 
directors of International Corp., during which Jensen is elected to replace Fleming as 
president; February 19, 1991, Fleming is removed as a director; February 20, 1991, 
International Corp. sends notice of special shareholder meeting to Fleming advising him 
that directors of International Corp. had approved sale of all assets of International Corp. 
to IPS Co.; February 22, 1991, Fleming demands payment for his shares and dissents 
from the proposed sale of the assets of International Corp., to IPS Co.; March 15, 1991, 
International Corp sends Fleming notice of dissenters rights; Litigation commenced 
thereafter to determine share valuation. Fleming v. International Pizza Supply Corp., 640 
N.E.2d 1077, 1078-79 (Ind. App. 1994). 
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N.W. 2d 794, 801 (Iowa 1997), the dissenting minority shareholders claimed that the 
majority shareholders had mismanaged the company over several years, reducing its 
value. The dissenters argued that they were entitled to a price based on the company's 
value prior to the alleged mismanagement. Id. The court, construing an appraisal statute 
identical to Utah's, considered the phrase "immediately before" controlling, and ruled 
that "[consequently, it is the value of the stock on that date not some prior or subsequent 
date, that is important. This fact influences the events and factors that may properly be 
considered by the court...." Id. at 798 (emphasis added). In those cases where evidence 
of breach of fiduciary duty has been considered it is typically related in some way to the 
merger itself. See, e^., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Delaware 1983) 
(allowing claims of fraud, misrepresentation, et al., to be considered in questioning the 
validity of a merger because the claims arose in close time proximity - several months -
and in relation to the merger); SIEG Company v. Kelly, 568 N.W. 2d 794, 801 (Iowa 
1997) (refusing to consider claims of wrongdoing unrelated to the merger); Cavalier Oil 
Corporation v. Harnett, 564 A. 2d 1137 (Delaware 1989) (considering a pre-merger 
corporate opportunity claim, but only because the parties stipulated to litigating it in the 
appraisal proceeding). There at least is some rationale for considering claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty related to the appraisal process because such behavior may undermine 
the integrity of the process by which fair value is determined. That is not the case in the 
instant litigation. 
There are sound policy reasons why old claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
unrelated to the merger should not be allowed to influence the fair value determination in 
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a statutory merger proceeding. For example, fair value based upon a previously 
unasserted fiduciary duty claim will no longer reflect a value a buyer would have paid a 
seller for the stock as of the date immediately prior to the merger, as is required by the 
statute. Instead, it will artificially inflate the value by an award of damages never 
entered, for alleged past wrongs never asserted during the life of the company. In the real 
world no buyer would ever have agreed to pay the Groesbecks $1,325 million for their 
shares of this company. 
To allow a breach of fiduciary claim to be raised for the first time in a statutory 
merger proceeding allows the claimant to avoid all of the common law and statutory 
protections that otherwise would protect against stale claims. In the instant litigation, for 
example, the Groesbecks knew in 1986 that Kennecott intended to begin stripping the 
surface of the New Bingham claims. They had the means if they desired to personally 
inspect the claims at any time by going to the public visitors center at the mine where the 
claims are in full view. Moreover, they were twice given the name and telephone number 
of the mine manager for the express purpose of arranging an inspection of the claims. 
They had demonstrated their ability to inspect records at the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & 
Mining to learn what mining was occurring. They were represented by counsel. They 
learned in 1992 details about Kennecott's mining plans but they never filed suit or even 
raised an objection. Instead, they waited until the company had been merged out of 
existence to assert their claims. By that time memories had faded and witnesses had 
almost all disappeared, leaving the trial court in the instant litigation to try to parse 
language in meeting minutes in an effort to determine even what had occurred. 
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To allow a review of the management of the corporation for past violations of 
fiduciary duties will allow dissenting shareholders to both reap the rewards of stock 
ownership during the life of the corporation, and then to pursue an antithetical course 
after the merger to gain additional rewards. Such a rule of law will allow a free pass at 
the time of any merger or dissolution to revive stale claims, with the dissenter already 
having received the benefit that the course of action might have provided the company. 
For example, in the instant litigation, had the Groesbecks raised their claims as they 
should have in the 1980's, Kennecott might have changed its mine plans, or the lease 
might have been renegotiated or ratified on the same terms with the Groesbecks being 
outvoted as they were in 1979, or any number of other consequences. Instead, by 
keeping quiet and accepting the status quo until after the merger, the Groesbecks avoided 
all of those risks and are now able to attack the management of the company with no risk 
to themselves or their investment whatsoever. 
This proceeding effectively allowed Groesbecks to run New Bingham after the 
fact despite their having only a 3.8% minority interest. In 1979 the Groesbecks wanted to 
reject the lease because it did not pay enough. They were outvoted by all shareholders, 
including other minority shareholders. In 1986 they opposed amendment of the articles 
of incorporation, but were outvoted. At the time of the 1997 merger, all of the 
shareholders voted to approve the merger and the valuation except Groesbecks. But now 
that all other shareholders are gone, and the company no longer exists, the court, by 
ruling as it did, allowed Groesbecks alone to revise history and hypothetically manage the 
company by determining that the company would terminate the lease and hold out for a 
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new lease for $36 million dollars. By doing so the court not only rewrote history, but 
swept away all controls that would otherwise exist for management of a corporation and 
allowed Groesbecks to preempt the votes of all other shareholders. 
Finally, to allow claims for breach of fiduciary duty to be pursued in a statutory 
merger proceeding avoids all of the requirements for shareholder derivative suits which 
have evolved over time in the common law and by statute and which would otherwise 
pertain. Claims that the corporation has been injured by breach of fiduciary duty are 
derivative and properly are enforced by the corporation in a shareholder derivative suit. 
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.,20 P.3d 868, 872 (Utah 2000). Derivative suits are "those 
which seek to enforce any right which belongs to the corporation." Richardson v. 
Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740 sets 
forth the procedures for initiating a shareholder derivative suit which include among 
other things written demand on the directors and a complaint pled with particularity. 
Here the Groesbecks were able to bypass the procedures (15 years later) required of a 
shareholder derivative suit. By allowing shareholder derivative claims to be heard in the 
appraisal proceeding the court is setting a precedent that stands to nullify the purpose of 
Utah's derivative proceedings statute and associated common law. 
II. THE COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
DISREGARD KENNECOTT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE MINING LEASE. 
Kennecott mined the surface of the New Bingham claims pursuant to the rights 
granted under the mining lease (Ex. 3), which Anaconda obtained originally from New 
Bingham in 1979 before Anaconda sold its 86% of New Bingham to Kennecott. 
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Kennecott succeeded Anaconda to the lease. In order to conclude that the New Bingham 
management breached its fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders the trial court had 
to disregard Kennecott's rights under the lease. 
In the 1979 mining lease Anaconda was granted the right in the broadest possible 
terms to mine the New Bingham claims: 
III. RIGHTS GRANTED 
3.1 Lessor hereby grants to Anaconda during the term 
hereof the exclusive right, subject to the terms hereof: 
(b) to develop, extract, take, mine, save and sell minerals 
from the Property, and to engage in related operations with 
respect to all veins, loads and mineral deposits contained in or 
on the Property, to construct and maintain on the Property all 
works and buildings and other structures, machinery and 
facilities necessary for such mining and related operations; 
Ex. 3. Kennecott succeeded to the position of Anaconda under the lease as a result of the 
1985 asset purchase and Kennecott thereafter conducted mining operations 
simultaneously on the New Bingham claims and on Kennecott's own claims surrounding 
the New Bingham property (much of it acquired from Anaconda) pursuant to the terms of 
the lease. The one remaining witness who had been a member of the New Bingham 
management testified that he and other managers read the lease after the 1985 transaction 
and believed that the lease gave Kennecott the right to mine the surface of the New 
Bingham claims. R. 1192, p. 122. Further, he believed that it was in the best interest of 
New Bingham to keep the lease as it was the company's only source of revenue. R. 
1192, p. 121. 
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At trial evidence was taken regarding the nature of surface mining operations. 
Surface mining by definition is the removal of the surface of the earth. The type of 
mineralization located on the surface of the New Bingham claims was disseminated 
prophyry ore that was spread throughout the claims. R. 1192, p. 83. Whether material 
removed from the surface of a claim is waste or ore is an economic determination. When 
minerals are encountered in sufficient concentration and quantity to be economical, the 
material is classified as ore. Any material that falls below the economic cut off is waste. 
Ore is processed. Waste goes to the mine dump. The process of removing waste or 
overburden is sometimes referred to as "stripping." Stripping is part and parcel of 
surface mining. R. 1192, pp. 81-82, 116. 
Evidence was also taken at the trial, and not disputed, that the New Bingham 
claims were too small to be mined independently. The company had no employees or 
equipment or capability to mine the claims. The claims were surrounded by property 
owned by others and there was not enough property to conduct a surface operation. R. 
1192, pp. 122-123. The only way in which New Bingham could realize value from its 
claims was to partner with a larger, adjoining operation which would mine the claims, 
bear the expense of a work force, equipment and the removal of overburden, and pay 
New Bingham a royalty on any ore removed. R. 1192, pp. 122-123. 
Anaconda first served that function, but quickly demonstrated that underground 
mining of the claims could not be sustained economically. With the disappearance of 
Anaconda the only option for New Bingham was surface mining by Kennecott as part of 
Kennecott's own operation. R. 1192, pp. 123-124. 
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Both the former New Bingham manager and the experts called by the Groesbecks 
at trial agreed that stripping of overburden is part of surface mining and that surface 
mining is not possible without stripping. R. 1192, p. 116; R. 1194, p. 344. After 
admitting that in order to mine on the surface, a miner has to strip the surface, 
Groesbecks' expert witness went so far as to admit: 
Q. And so surface mining rights, by necessary 
implication, includes stripping rights, does it not? 
A. By implication, I would think so yes. 
R. 1194, pp. 344. 
Groesbecks' expert also admitted that "[i]f the lease provides Kennecott with the 
right to strip that land, then the value of the New Bingham-Mary Mining Company is 
$2.2 million." R. 1194, p. 335. 
Not surprisingly, Groesbecks' expert was not asked to render an opinion in this 
case about whether or not the 1979 lease allowed Kennecott to mine the surface. He was 
simply asked to assume, and did assume for purposes of his analysis, that there was not a 
lease in place that would allow Kennecott to mine the surface. R. 1194, p. 343. In 
contrast, the trial court specifically found that the terms of the lease did include the right 
to mine the surface and to strip the* surface of the claims. Finding of Fact no. 24, R. 1141. 
Under these circumstances the trial court, in order to conclude that New Bingham 
management had breached fiduciary duties by allowing Kennecott to mine the surface of 
the New Bingham claims, and to award Groesbecks additional compensation for the right 
to strip overburden, had to disregard its own findings and to disregard Kennecott's rights 
583050 1 26 
under the express terms of the mining lease. It did so by admitting and considering 
extrinsic evidence to interpret the lease. In Findings of Fact nos. 15 and 16 and 
Conclusion of Law no. 51 the court concluded: 
15. On August 18, 1978, New Bingham Mary sent a letter 
to its shareholders informing them: 'An agreement is now 
being negotiated between Anaconda and [New Bingham] 
Mary that will permit Anaconda to conduct under-ground 
mining operations on the Mary and Commonwealth claims 
through the facilities of [Anaconda's] Carr Fork mine.' The 
letter also stated: 'Also there have been negotiations between 
officials of Anaconda, your management and officials of 
Kennecott to agree on a three-party cross-stripping agreement 
which would allow Kennecott to expand the boundaries of its 
Bingham open-pit mine by stripping waste material and low-
grade ore material from the surface of property of Anaconda 
and New Bingham Mary adjacent to the present boundaries of 
the Bingham pit.' 
16. Based on the statements of Anaconda, the intent of the 
proposed lease was to allow Anaconda to mine ore from the 
Claims by underground mining methods, but was not 
intended to convey the right to strip waste material from the 
surface of the Claims for the purpose of obtaining access to 
ore on adjacent property. 
51. Extrinsic evidence concerning the intent of the parties 
to the Lease is admissible to allow the Court to determine 
whether the Lease is ambiguous and, if so, to interpret the 
Lease 
R. at 1142-1167. 
The law does not allow the trial court to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning 
an integrated, unambiguous lease that effectively rewrites the lease for the benefit of one 
of the parties. Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) ("The plain meaning rule preserves the intent of the parties 
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and protects the contract against judicial revision) (emphasis added). The parol evidence 
rule is specifically designed "to preserve the sanctity of written instruments." Stanger v. 
Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). "Simply stated, the rule 
operates, in the absence of fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Hall v. Process Inst. & Control, 
890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Under the parol evidence rule, the 
language of an integrated, unambiguous contract is to be given its plain and ordinary 
meaning, and the parties' intent is to be determined solely from the four corners of the 
agreement, without resort to any extrinsic evidence. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Extrinsic evidence should 
only be considered by a court after first considering the language of the contract itself, 
"and accord to it the weight and effect which it may show was intended." Big Butte 
Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977). Additionally, the existence of 
ambiguity in a contract is a question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983). 
There is no finding by the trial court that the contract language of the lease is 
ambiguous, or what specific language is ambiguous. If the court had first carefully 
considered the lease language it would have correctly determined that no ambiguity 
existed regarding the rights granted the lessee, and that there is no reference whatsoever 
to the "purpose" of the lessee, or to any requirement that lessee be motivated by a desire 
to benefit the lessor more than itself. The court effectively rewrote the lease to add the 
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requirement that the lessee's purpose in mining must be primarily to benefit the lessor's, 
not the lessee's operation. There is nothing in the lease which requires any such 
demonstration of the lessor's motivation, nor would there ever be since no partner would 
undertake to mine 16 acres of ground unless by doing so it could benefit its own 
operation. No ambiguity existed in the lease language and the extrinsic evidence used by 
the court was inadmissible. 
Further, the Court's Finding of Fact no. 15 was based on statements of intent it 
gleaned from an informational letter to New Bingham shareholders dated August 18, 
1978 discussing various subjects. The court failed to consider the other expression of 
intent in advance of the vote on the lease, that being the official proxy statement dated 
April 4, 1979 which advised shareholders of the meeting to be held April 25,1979 to vote 
on the lease, and which described the lease in anticipation of the vote. Ex. 125. The 
proxy statement does not support the court's interpretation. In the proxy statement the 
management explained that Anaconda was developing an underground copper mine that 
would be the "most efficient method of extracting the mineralized metal" from the New 
Bingham claims. However, the proxy statement also reported, 
estimates of additional tonnages of mineral resources have 
been made. These are classified as two basic types: Skarn or 
replacement mineralization - - 150 million tons averaging 
1.3% total copper; and disseminated mineralization - - 264 
million tons at an average grade of 0.56% total copper. The 
skarn deposit could be mined by underground methods and 
the disseminated tonnage could be developed by a 
combination of open pit and underground mining methods. 
Additional drilling will be required to verify these tonnages 
and grades prior to consideration of a specific mining plan. 
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Ex. 125, p. 2 (emphasis added). The proxy statement further explained, under the 
heading "Description of Proposed Lease": 
The essential terms of the proposed mining lease are as 
follows: 
1. Purpose. Anaconda acquires the right to occupy and 
use the MARY and COMMONWEALTH lode mining claims 
to explore for, extract and sell minerals subject to certain 
royalty payments. 
Id., p. 4. The mining rights were described in broad terms with no suggestion that mining 
could only occur underground. 
If extrinsic evidence is considered the evidence supports the interpretation that 
Anaconda was developing an underground mine at the time of this lease, and that 
underground mining was the method anticipated to be employed immediately. But the 
language of the proxy statement also indicated that there was an even larger quantity, at a 
lower grade, of disseminated tonnage that could be mined by a combination of open pit 
and underground mining methods. The proxy statement did not describe the lease for 
purposes of the voting shareholders as one restricted to underground mining, and the 
lease itself in no way restricts mining to underground methods. 
The lease granted the right to mine the New Bingham claims with no restriction as 
to the mining method. The distinction the trial court drew between stripping and mining 
is contrary to the evidence, contrary to how they are used in the mining industry, and 
contrary to the court's own findings. The court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence to 
alter the terms of the lease, and erred in concluding that the lease did not allow Kennecott 
to benefit in the process of mining the New Bingham claims. 
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III. THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AN ARM'S-LENGTH 
NEGOTIATION WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN COMPENSATION TO 
NEW BINGHAM IN THE AMOUNT OF $36 MILLION IS INHERENTLY 
SPECULATIVE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The court concluded in Finding of Fact no. 34 as follows: 
34. Had the Lease been terminated, New Bingham Mary 
would have been entitled to negotiate a new lease on the 
Claims as of 1987. An arm's length negotiation would have 
resulted in fair and reasonable compensation to New 
Bingham Mary for the value of stripping rights, the value of 
shallower, porphyry that can be mined using open-pit 
methods, and the value of deeper, skarn ore that can be mined 
using underground mining methods. 
R. 1141. The court then went on to conclude that the amount of compensation negotiated 
would have been $36 million. This conclusion is inherently speculative and not 
supported by the evidence. It is undisputed that none of these events occurred. 
The lease was not terminated. As part of the follow-up to the 1985 asset purchase 
the lease was assigned by Anaconda to Kennecott but the requirement that written 
consent of New Bingham be obtained in advance was overlooked. R. 1193, p. 207. The 
lease provides that such consent will not be unreasonably withheld. Ex. 3, para. 15.1. 
When Kennecott realized that the consent had been overlooked, written consent was 
obtained. The lease was not terminated because, as the former member of New Bingham 
management testified, the management believed the lease allowed Kennecott to mine the 
surface (R. 1192, p. 122), Kennecott was the only miner available to work the claims (Id., 
p. 123), and the lease was the company's only source of revenue. Id., p. 121. Had this 
issue been put to shareholders in 1987 it is equally likely that the same result would have 
prevailed as was obtained in the 1979 vote on the lease. There the Groesbecks 
583050.1 31 
complained that the company was not getting enough money for the lease and voted 
against it, but none of the other minority shareholders agreed with them. There is no 
reason to believe that the shareholders would have voted to eliminate the only source of 
income from the claims which the company had enjoyed in 50 years, abandon even any 
pretense of being a mining company, and instead try to hold up Kennecott for $36 
million. 
Neither was there a negotiation of a new lease. Had there been, the evidence 
certainly does not support the conclusion that Kennecott would have agreed to pay $36 
million under a new lease, and in fact compels the opposite conclusion. Kennecott 
waited years to buy all of Anaconda's property, of which the New Bingham claims was a 
fraction (and only a fraction of the acquired land used to expand the pit), refusing to pay 
tens of millions of dollars for it. 
Evidence that can be marshaled in support of the trial court's finding is the opinion 
from Groesbecks' expert of the value of the mineralization available to Kennecott as a 
result of incorporating the New Bingham claims into Kennecott's mining operation, and 
his opinion that a prudent buyer in hypothetical circumstances (but not necessarily 
Kennecott) would agree that $36 million is fair compensation for the right to access that 
mineralization. Also there was evidence that Anaconda was getting out of the mining 
business. R. 1193, p. 149. The price paid by Kennecott was described by a former 
Kennecott manager as "a nuisance value," a "minor amount of money . . . compared to 
the investment Anaconda had made in that property." Id., p. 147. The same witness 
described two other properties that Anaconda had sold at the same time at bargain prices. 
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Id., pp. 149-151. Kennecott had studied the value to it of access to the Anaconda 
property and concluded that such access might result in millions or even billions of 
dollars in increased revenue, depending on the economic and other assumptions. Ex. 
101, 102; R. 1193, pp. 165-168. 
On the other hand, a Kennecott manager testified at trial that, despite studies 
concluding that access to all of the Anaconda property could mean hundreds of millions 
of dollars in increased gross revenues to Kennecott (from gaining access to its own ore), 
Kennecott never offered or even considered offering to Anaconda tens of millions of 
dollars for Anaconda's property. R. 1192, p. 104. Anaconda for its part never demanded 
that it be paid some percentage of the money it anticipated Kennecott would be able to 
earn by expanding the Bingham pit. Id., p. 108. Instead Kennecott paid and Anaconda 
accepted $5 million for many more acres than the 16 occupied by the New Bingham 
claims, and now incorporated into Kennecott's operation. Anaconda was a rational 
economic actor. R. 1193, p. 223. Anaconda knew that Kennecott wanted to buy 
Anaconda's property so that Kennecott could expand its pit. Id., pp. 223-224. The trial 
court failed to consider at all the Anaconda sale, which had occurred only two years 
before the negotiation of a new lease with New Bingham would supposedly have 
occurred. Groesbecks' experts, upon whose testimony the court relied to establish the 
value for a new lease, specifically disclaimed at trial any opinion about what would have 
happened had Kennecott and New Bingham actually negotiated a new lease. R. 1194, pp. 
343-344. In fact, such a negotiation would strongly have favored Kennecott since 
Kennecott already had the right to mine the claims and would have disputed even the 
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premise leading to any renegotiation. Kennecott had a viable ongoing operation without 
incorporating the New Bingham claims and could have reconfigured its mine and waited 
out New Bingham. R. 1192, p. 125; R. 1194, pp. 346-347. In short, there is simply not a 
sufficient evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that, under the circumstances actually 
existing between New Bingham and Kennecott in 1987, Kennecott would have agreed to 
pay such an enormous sum of money. 
IV, THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS DID 
NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THEIR LEGAL CLAIMS IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In Finding of Fact no. 33 the court concluded that the minority shareholders did 
not have notice of Kennecott's activities on the mining claims prior to the merger. In 
Finding of Fact no. 48 the court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence does 
not show that any minority shareholder discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have discovered the breaches of fiduciary duties by Kennecott and New Bingham 
Mary's officers and directors. The conclusions are not supported by the evidence. 
The Groesbecks' actions over the years show that as a matter of course they 
harbored deep suspicions about the majority shareholder, whether it was Anaconda or 
Kennecott. They were always represented by counsel. Groesbecks were obviously 
familiar with the terms of the lease because in 1979 they appeared at the shareholder 
meeting with their lawyer to argue against specific provisions in the lease. Ex. 2. In 
1982, through their lawyer, they wrote to Anaconda to demand an accounting. They 
revealed that they knew mining was occurring on New Bingham claims because they had 
researched records at the Utah Division of Oil Gas & Mining. They alleged that the 
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rights of minority shareholders had been disregarded. Ex. 5. Groesbecks also revealed in 
their 1982 letter, "we also have reason to believe that Kennecott Copper may also be 
conducting a surface mining operation on the New Bingham claims." Id. Although 
Kennecott was not mining on the claims at that time, Groesbecks obviously knew that the 
claims were close enough to Kennecott, and of sufficient interest to Kennecott, to make 
Kennecott's mining of the claims a real possibility. In fact, Clay Groesbeck admitted at 
trial that he had known since 1978 that the New Bingham claims were of interest to 
Kennecott and might be of some value for Kennecott operations. R. 1193, p. 246. 
The trial court failed to consider the 1986 shareholder meeting. In 1986, after the 
New Bingham management had been replaced by employees of Kennecott, New 
Bingham held a shareholders meeting at which the purchase of Anaconda's assets by 
Kennecott was discussed and at which the management announced the plans of 
Kennecott in unmistakable terms: "Kennecott intends to mine across the claims for waste 
removal and construction of the roads." Ex. 12. As both the former Kennecott employee 
and the Groesbecks' experts admitted at trial, waste removal is "stripping", the activity 
about which the Groesbecks have since expressed such surprise. 
Following the 1986 meeting the Groesbecks met with Kennecott managers. Ex. 
15,16; R. 1193, p. 251. They demanded and received records of New Bingham. Ex. 17; 
R. 1193, pp. 252-253. They demanded but were refused detailed information about 
Kennecott's mining plans (R. 1193, p. 253) but they did not pursue the issue. Among the 
materials they did receive were another copy of the 1979 mining lease and a location map 
for the New Bingham claims. Ex.17; R. 1193, p. 133. Groesbecks were twice given the 
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name and telephone number of the Kennecott mine manager to contact to arrange to see 
the claims, an opportunity they never took advantage of at that time or any subsequent 
time. R. 1193, pp. 251, 254-256. They also never went to the Kennecott visitors center, 
which is open to the public, and which affords a view of the claims. R. 1193, p. 256. 
At the 1992 shareholder meeting the New Bingham managers talked in detail 
about the mine plan and revealed the specific tonnages Kennecott anticipated would be 
removed from the New Bingham claims. Ex. 22. The trial Court did not consider this 
detailed information conveyed to shareholders at the 1992 meeting. Also at the 1992 
meeting shareholders were told that a topical map was available and would be sent to all 
shareholders requesting it. Id. 
The court found that minority shareholders were not told of the value Kennecott 
had earlier placed on the Anaconda property. The evidence shows, however, that the 
studies Kennecott did of the potential value of access to the Anaconda property were 
highly confidential and were not revealed outside a small management group at 
Kennecott. Those studies were never revealed at all outside that group until Kennecott 
was forced to produce them pursuant to a subpoena and an order compelling production 
over Kennecott's objection in this litigation. R. 1192, pp. 104-105. Regardless who was 
managing New Bingham, the company would never have had access to Kennecott's 
confidential analyses, and that information would not have been available to the 
Groesbecks. 
Evidence which can be marshaled to support the court's conclusion is that, at the 
1986 shareholder meeting, when asked whether in the future the claims would be mined 
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by open pit, the New Bingham Management said "probably not in the near future 
[illegible] at depth - high cost." Also at that meeting shareholders were told "we'll 
research history of discussions between Anaconda/Kennecott/Bingham Mary", but the 
management witness at trial testified that he did not know what issue that referred to, but 
that he was not aware that anyone from New Bingham or Kennecott ever did that 
research. R. 1193, pp. 185-186. Because stripping did not start until 1989, the 
Groesbecks, had they gone to the mine in 1986 or 1987, would not have seen mining on 
the claims. Id., p. 204. The 1992 shareholder meeting minutes do not reveal 
management saying specifically that mining had been proceeding on the claims for three 
years as of that time. Ex. 22. In the 1992 meeting management advised shareholders that 
the New Bingham Mary claims were "above and around the open-pit". Ex. 22. 
Management did not reveal to minority shareholders the value to Kennecott of access to 
the New Bingham claims. Management did not reveal to minority shareholders that, 
because assignment of the lease had inadvertently preceded written consent by New 
Bingham, New Bingham had the right to terminate the lease. R. 1193, p. 214. Clay 
Groesbeck testified that as of 1992 he was not aware of any information that caused him 
to believe the minority shareholders needed to bring an action against the officers and 
directors of New Bingham Mary. R. 1193, p. 238. 
On balance, the overwhelming evidence shows that since at least 1986 the 
Groesbecks knowingly sat on their legal claims against New Bingham speculating that 
New Bingham's 3% production royalty and the $25,000 annual income on their small 
isolated parcel was preferable to imaginary alternatives. Before the lease New Bingham 
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had lain dormant for five decades (1928-1979), apparently producing no income at all. 
Once the Groesbecks had been bought out there was no consequence to their taking a 
broadside at New Bingham's single mining lease, the only business the company ever 
had over its seventy year life. A number of familiar legal doctrines should prevent them 
from doing this. 
One is the statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 sets a three year 
limitation on actions against corporate directors. Nothing in Utah's merger statute, 
including the provision relating to appraisal rights for minority shareholders, trumps the 
statute of limitations and permits the revival of stale independent or affirmative claims. 
The statute of limitations applies to the Groesbecks because their claims are not 
defensive. Rather, they are independent causes of action (though no longer denominated 
as such following the dismissal of their counterclaims) and seek affirmative relief. See 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 132-33 (Utah 1997); 
Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Utah 1985). Moreover, based on information 
provided at the 1986 shareholders meeting, the Groesbecks were expressly put on notice 
as to the intentions of Kennecott to mine across the claims for waste removal. As such, 
the statute of limitations on any causes of action the Groesbecks may have had against 
New Bingham began to run as of the 1986 shareholders meeting. Further, the discovery 
rule does not allow a plaintiff to delay filing suit until he has ascertained every last detail 
of his claim. All that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is sufficient 
information to apprise the plaintiff of the underlying cause of action so as to put him on 
notice to make further inquiry if he harbors doubts or questions about the defendant's 
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actions. McCollin v. Svnthes, Inc. 50 F. Supp.2d 1119, 1124 (D. Utah 1999), quoting 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993). 
One who is put on inquiry notice of a potential harm must exercise due diligence to 
inquire into the situation, and the limitations will not be tolled while the plaintiff makes 
this inquiry. See Walker Drug Co. v. LaSal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Utah 
1995). At the very least the evidence supports the conclusion that the Groesbecks were 
on inquiry notice beginning in 1986, yet they did nothing. 
Groesbecks' claims are also barred by the doctrine of laches. It is a longstanding 
axiom that "equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights." Black's 
Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed., West 1990) (defining laches). The Groesbecks were put on 
notice in 1986 that Kennecott intended to mine across the surface of the New Bingham 
claims and were given the name and telephone number of the mine manager to come and 
see for themselves. For the next twelve years the Groesbecks, New Bingham and all 
other shareholders sat idly by as Kennecott mined the claims and New Bingham earned 
royalties. 
Utah courts will bar a claim under the doctrine of laches when two elements are 
met: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the claimant; and (2) injury to the defendant due 
to the lack of diligence. Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 
535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Utah courts have often used the length of a claimant's 
delay when analyzing the first element of laches. See e.g., Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff Min. 
& Mill 191 P. 426, 433 (Utah 1920) (upholding a laches defense after fifteen years); 
Raht v. Sevier Mining & Milling Co.. 54 P. 889, 891 (Utah 1898) (upholding a laches 
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defense after four years). Here the Groesbecks waited twelve years after the 1986 
shareholder meeting to first complain about surface mining, and did not assert their claim 
in litigation until they filed their counterclaim after the passage of fifteen years. 
In the context of mining cases, Utah courts have interpreted the second element as 
met when an unjust windfall accrues to a claimant who sat on his rights, essentially 
speculating that the rights would be more valuable at a later date. In Jones Min. Co., for 
example, the court barred plaintiffs claim that it had been defrauded out of a mining 
claim because plaintiff had failed to assert its rights for fifteen years, during which time 
the defendant had developed the claim and made it valuable. The following language 
describes the principle: 
There is no class of property more subject to sudden and 
violent fluctuations of value than mining lands. A location 
which to-day may have no salable value may in a month 
become worth its millions. Years may be spent in working 
such property apparently to no purpose, when suddenly a 
mass of rich ore may be discovered, from which an immense 
fortune is realized. Under such circumstance, persons having 
claims to such property are bound to the utmost diligence in 
enforcing them, and there is no class of cases in which the 
doctrine of laches has been more relentlessly enforced. 
Jones Min. Co., 191 P. at 430 (quoting Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 321 (1920). 
The Groesbecks did not bring their claims when there was the risk of opposition 
from other shareholders or the risk that the current mining lease might have been lost as a 
result. They have done so only now when there are no other shareholders and no risk of 
chasing off the lessee with litigation, and years after Kennecott committed itself to a 
mining plan and cost structure incorporating the mining claims of New Bingham. It is 
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just such behavior that the Utah Supreme Court vigorously opposed when upholding a 
laches defense in the Jones case. 
Finally, defendants' claims are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In 
1986 the Groesbecks were told that Kennecott intended to mine across the surface of the 
claims. They were reminded again in 1992 in very explicit terms when management 
described the millions of tons of ore to be mined from the New Bingham claims pursuant 
to Kennecott's mine plan. From 1986 until 1998 there was never once a suggestion by 
New Bingham, the Groesbecks or any other shareholder that surface mining was 
precluded by the lease. Kennecott relied on the inaction and lack of objection by New 
Bingham and the Groesbecks and invested capital and undertook all the risks associated 
with mining to expand its pit and recover ore for itself and New Bingham. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel "prevents] one party from deluding or inducing 
another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss." Koch v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 
534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975). The elements of estoppel are : (1) an admission, 
statement or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted; (2) action by the other 
party on the faith of such admission, statement or act; and (3) injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement or act. Dep't of Human Servs. Ex rel. Parker v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 680 
(Utah 1997). Failure to object over a period of time supports an estoppel claim. Brixen 
& Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1044 (Utah App. 1989) (party's 
failure to object to architect's work on subsequent phases of a project over a six month 
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time period was evidence of conduct other party could reasonably rely on when 
proceeding with project). 
There is no evidence that at any time during any of the shareholder meetings or the 
private meetings with Kennecott mine managers, or in any other manner, did the 
Groesbecks or any other minority shareholder raise any objection to Kennecott's plans to 
mine across the surface and to remove millions of tons of material from the New 
Bingham claims. Neither did Groesbecks file suit. What Kennecott was doing was 
certainly not hidden. Its mine is visible to the public and Groesbecks had an invitation to 
receive a personal tour of the claims. The conclusion the evidence supports is that the 
Groesbecks and the other minority shareholders were happy to have Kennecott mining 
their claims and paying them royalties under the lease. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court's judgment does not reflect the fair value of New Bingham stock as 
of the time of the merger, but rather represents an award of damages for a lawsuit never 
filed and a value far removed from a realistic appraisal. 
Appellant requests that the lower court judgment awarding compensation for 
"stripping rights" be reversed, and that Groesbecks be awarded compensation based on 
the market value of the stock at $3.50 per share, less $1.10 per share already paid, or a 
total of $88,322.40, plus interest. 
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DATED this 7 ^ ay of May, 2004. 
^LAJ -X? 
JOHN B. WILSON 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and ADDellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _7V^.day of May, 2004, I caused to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT, to: 
Robert S. Clark 
Daniel E. Barnett 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellees 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
igljuO. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330(1), § 16-10a-1301 (4) 
2. Memorandum decision. R. 1137-1140. 
3. Judgment. R. 1168-1171. 
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 1141-1167. 
5. 1979 Mining Lease between Anaconda and New Bingham Mary. Ex. 3. 
6. Aerial photograph of property. Ex. 26. 
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Tabl 
16-10a-1330. Judicial appraisal of shares - Court ac-
tion. 
(1) If a demand for payment under Section 16-10a-1328 
remains unresolved, the corporation shall commence a pro-
ceeding within 60 days after receiving the payment demand 
contemplated by Section 16-10a-1328, and petition the court 
to determine the fair value of the shares and the amount ol 
interest. If the corporation does not commence the proceeding 
within the 60-day period, it shall pay each dissenter whose 
demand remains unresolved the amount demanded. 
16-10*1301. Definitions. 
For purposes of Part 13: 
(4) "Fair value" with respect to a dissenter's shares, 
means the value of the shares immediately before the 
effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter 
objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in 
anticipation of the corporate action. 
Tab 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 'Til T'IL i . i m I r rnf A I , I n S T R i r"]' 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTS SIAlh. OF -iVAh 
lJ 1 N«;HrtM Ct ill . M | , ! HA 1 I i. i]J ZOMPAN Yf 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT GROSBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROSBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROSBECK 
AND R. CLAY GROSBECK, as 
Trustees of the ROBERT R. 
GROSBECK LIVING TRUST, a Utah 
Trust,. 
Defendants. 
This matter was tried to the bench and was taken under 
advisement at the conclusion of trial, and the Court now issues its 
Memorandum Decision. 
The Court accepts the Stipulation of Facts of the parties and, 
as stated therein, the issue for determination by the Court is the 
fair value of defendants' shares of New Bingham Mary Mining Company 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 16-10a-1330. 
In its capacity as the majority and controlling shareholder of 
New Bingham Mary Mining Company, plaintiff owed defendants 
fiduciary duties, including the duty to maximize value for all 
shareholders, and the duty to act in a fair and responsible manner 
with respect to the minority shareholders. 
r i i i n u js-ttj>f u i i PI i f n u ± o i v / „w 
J^ 
CASE NO. 9809048fl5f»4h**.. 
'hi 
BINGHAM CONSOLIDATION 
CO. V. GROSBECK PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff caused the affairs of the New Bingham Mary Mining 
Company to be operated in a way which was to its benefit and to the 
detriment of the minority shareholders. This constitutes a breach 
of fiduciary duty on the plaintiff's part. The appraisal presented 
by the plaintiff at trial was not independent and was based on 
information that could only lead to a determination that was 
unfairly favorable to the plaintiff. The Court adopts the 
appraisals and methodology of Mr. Guarnera and Mr. Bellum with 
respect to the fair value of the property. 
With respect to specific findings, the Motions in Limine by 
both parties are denied. 
To fail to consider the stripping rights on the property would 
simply be unfair to the defendants. Plaintiff failed to disclose 
information regarding its plan to strip mine the company, and the 
value of said strip mining from the minority defendants. There are 
obvious conflicts of interest between plaintiff and defendants 
which conflicts result in the aforementioned breach of fiduciary 
duty and also acted to the detriment of the defendants. The Court 
finds that the Lease and assignment thereof included stripping 
rights, and that plaintiff didn't make full disclosure to 
defendants, failed to be candid about its plans, or the financial 
implications of its plans. Interest should be awarded to the 
defendants at the legal rate from the date that defendants were 
BINGHAM CONSOLIDATION 
CO. V. GROSBECK PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
paid, at the rate of $1.10 per share, and at the Judgment rate 
after the Judgment is signed. 
Counsel for defendants shall prepare Findings, Conclusions and 
a Judgment, and shall include in the Findings of Fact all findings 
consistent with the evidence and this Memorandum Decision. 
I apologize for the time it has taken to reach this Decision, 
and want to acknowledge counsel on both sides of the case as having 
presented the matter professionally, fairly and efficiently 
Dated this I day of November^o2 00; 
By s, >V* ^ \ L*XV. js^ • 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^*-«.*^*"'' 
BINGHAM CONSOLIDATION 
CO. V. GROSBECK PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this day of 
November, 2 0 03: 
John B. Wilson 
Margaret Niver McGann 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 S. Main, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Robert S. Clark 
Daniel E. Barnett 
Attorneys for Defendants 
185 S. State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tab 3 
IMAGED 
Robert S.Clark (4015) 
Daniel E. Barnett (8579) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Judgment @J 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 11|||||| 111 III I 
Facsimile: (801)532-7750 II II III 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
• J A N 1 5 200$ 
SAL* SALT LAKE ^OUtoV 
•TOpiT 
>»Jty Cterk 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JD13562582 
980904874 BINGHAM CONSOLIDATION COMPANY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DibIRiCI COURI OF 





ROBERT GROESBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROESBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROESBECK and 
R. CLAY GROESBECK as Trustees of the 
ROBERT R. GROESBECK LIVING 







Civil No. 980904874 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was tried to the bench on August 4, 5, and 6, 2003, Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod, District Court Judge, presiding. The issues having been duly tried and the Court having duly 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: 
ORDERED AND "-UDGED
 t h a t Defendants recover fro? - M ;. »-c amount of 
$1,325,204.00, plus prejudgment interest at the legal rate often percent per year from February 18, 
1998 to January 13, 2004, of $781,870.36. Defendants therefore recover from Plaintiff the amount 
of $2,107,074.36 as follows: 
Prejudgment 
Judgment Interest Total 
Marilyn Groesbeck 
Glade $530,067.20 $312,739.64 $842,806 84 
Robert Groesbeck $530,103.21 $312,760.89 $842,864 10 
Robert R. Groesbeck 
Living Trust $265,033.60 $156,369.82 $421,403.42; 
It is hereby further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants recover from Plaintiff interest at the rate of 
$3,630.70 per day from January 14, 2004, until the date this Judgment is signed as follows: Marilyn 
Groesbeck Glade, $1,452.24 per day; Robert Groesbeck, $1,452.34 per day; and Robert R. 
Groesbeck Living Trust, $726.12 per day; It is hereby further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each Defendant recover from Plaintiff interest at the 
judgment rate of 3.41 percent per year or as that rate may change from time to time from the date this 
Judgment is signed until this Judgment is satisfied; and It is hereby further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants recover from Plaintiff their costs incurred 
in this lawsuit. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of January 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [Proposed] Judgment to be served via hand delivery, on the following: 
John B. Wilson 
Margaret Niver McGann 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 




RobertS. Clark (4015) 
Daniel E. Barnett (8579) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants 
By. 
Flies mmm COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 15 2004 
SALT LAKE COUNTY \ ' \ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 





ROBERT GROESBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROESBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROESBECK and 
R. CLAY GROESBECK as Trustees of the 
ROBERT R. GROESBECK LIVING 
TRUST, a Utah Trust; 
Defendants. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 980904874 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was tried to the bench on August 4, 5, and 6, 2003. The Court accepted the 
Stipulation of Facts presented by the parties. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 1 through 26 were offered and 
accepted into evidence. Defendants' Trial Exhibits 100 through 131 were offered into evidence. 
Plaintiff objected to admission of Defendants' Trial Exhibits 108, 125, and 128. The Court took 
Plaintiffs objections under advisement. Testimony was taken from Gerald P. Halmbacher and 
William K Orchow on behalf of Plaintiffs, and from Robert Clay Groesbeck, Barney J Guarnera, and 
Donald P Bellum on behalf of Defendants The matter was taken under advisement at the conclusion 
of trial The Court's Memorandum Decision was entered on November 7, 2003 The Court now 
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. New Bingham Mary Mining Company ("New Bingham Mary") was a Utah 
corporation As of December 31, 1997, Defendants Robert Groesbeck, Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, 
and Robert Groesbeck and R Clay Groesbeck as Trustees of the Robert R Groesbeck Living Trust 
(collectively, "Defendants") collectively owned 36,801 of 971,200 issued and outstanding shares of 
stock in New Bingham Mary ("Shares") as follows Robert Groesbeck, 14,721 Shares, Marilyn 
Groesbeck Glade, 14,720 Shares, and Robert R Groesbeck Living Trust, 7,360 Shares 
2 New Bingham Mary was incorporated on April 8, 1929 Roy Groesbeck, the father 
of Defendants Robert Groesbeck and Marilyn Groesbeck Glade was one of the incorporators of New 
Bingham Mary in 1929, served as an original director of New Bingham Mary, and served as New 
Bingham Mary's first President Members of the Groesbeck family have been minority shareholders 
of New Bingham Mary during the entire nearly 70-year existence of New Bingham Mary, from the 
date of its incorporation until its merger with and into the plaintiff in this lawsuit, Bingham 
Consolidation Company ("Bingham Consolidation") 
3. Pursuant to a merger agreement ("Merger") among New Bingham Mary, Bingham 
Development Company, and plaintiff Bingham Consolidation, New Bingham Mary and Bingham 
Development Company were merged with and into Bingham Consolidation effective January 1,1998. 
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Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation (together with its predecessor in interest, Kennecott 
Corporation, "Kennecott") is the sole shareholder of Plaintiff, the surviving corporation pursuant to 
the Merger 
4 Defendants dissented from the Merger and Defendants properly perfected their 
dissenter's rights Defendants complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann § 16-10a-1330 et 
seq. and are entitled to an award equal to the fair value of their Shares. 
5. Defendants were paid by Bingham Consolidation on the basis of $1 10 per Share for 
their Shares 
6 Except for the dispute regarding the obligation to pay fair value for Defendants' 
Shares, the Merger was otherwise conducted in accordance with Utah Law 
7 This lawsuit was filed May 14, 1998 The issue for determination by the Court in this 
lawsuit is the fair value of Defendants' Shares of New Bingham Mary pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 16-10a-1330 
8. New Bingham Mary's principal assets consisted of two patented mining claims, the 
Mary and Commonwealth lode claims ("Claims") The Claims are now located within the Bingham 
open-pit copper mine ("Bingham Mine") operated by Kennecott The area of the Oquirrh Mountains 
in the vicinity of the Claims and the Bingham Mine where mining has taken place over the past several 
decades is referred to herein as the "Bingham District " 
9. The Claims and the surrounding area of the Oquirrh Mountains within the Bingham 
District contain two kinds of ore' higher-grade ore located at greater depth, so-called "skarn" ore, 
and lower-grade ore located at shallower depth, so-called "porphyry" ore The deeper, skarn ore was 
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formerly mined in the Bingham District by The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda") using underground 
mining methods. The shallower porphyry ore is mined in the Bingham District by Kennecott using 
open-pit or strip mining methods. 
10. Removing ore by open-pit methods requires stripping back the sides of the open pit 
at a relatively shallow angle to remove waste overlying and adjacent to the ore. It is dangerous to 
construct an open pit mine with steep walls because of the likelihood the walls of the pit will collapse 
into the open pit. Safely constructing an open pit mine requires the right to strip the surface over an 
area larger than the area of the ore body to be mined so the wall of the pit can be constructed at a 
safely shallow angle. 
11. On properties located closer to the center of an open pit mine, overburden and waste 
material are stripped from the surface first, then the underlying ore material is mined after the 
overburden and waste are removed On properties located toward the periphery of the mine, waste 
material is stripped from the surface, but no ore material is mined from the properties. Although no 
ore material is mined from those properties, stripping the waste from those properties provides access 
to ore contained in properties located closer to the center of the open pit mine. The right to strip 
waste from the surface of properties, or "stripping rights," thus has value that is separate from the 
right to mine ore from a property whether the mining is done at the surface or underground. The 
value of the stripping rights on a particular piece of property depends upon the amount of ore that 
could not otherwise be mined without the stripping rights, and is independent of the value of 
whatever ore material may be contained within the particular piece of property. 
12. Before 1985, Kennecott controlled mining properties within the Bingham District lying 
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east of an irregular, approximately north-south boundary line located near the western edge of 
Kennecott's open-pit Bingham Mine. Anaconda controlled mining properties lying west of the 
boundary. The ore on Anaconda's properties consisted primarily of skarn ore Anaconda's 
properties also contained porphyry ore, but not enough for Anaconda to profitably operate its own 
open-pit mine in the Bingham District. 'New Bingham Mary's Claims were located at the boundary 
of the Kennecott and Anaconda properties, adjacent to Kennecott's Bingham Mine on one side and 
adjacent to and part of Anaconda's underground mine on the other side. 
13. The location of the Claims adversely affected and complicated Kennecott's operation 
of its Bingham Mine because it prevented Kennecott from expanding its Bingham Mine to the west. 
Anaconda and Kennecott had discussions over many years during which the parties attempted to 
negotiate an agreement by which Kennecott would be able to expand its open pit by stripping across 
the Claims and other property controlled by Anaconda. One draft agreement was prepared but not 
signed in 1963. From at least as early as 1963, Kennecott and Anaconda recognized that the stripping 
rights to the Claims had significant economic value. 
14. As of August 18, 1978, Anaconda was the majority and controlling shareholder of 
New Bingham Mary. At that time, Anaconda owned approximately 86.63% of the issued and 
outstanding stock of New Bingham Mary. 
15. On August 18, 1978, New Bingham Mary sent a letter to its shareholders informing 
them: "An agreement is now being negotiated between Anaconda and [New Bingham] Mary that will 
permit Anaconda to conduct under-ground mining operations on the Mary and Commonwealth claims 
through the facilities of [Anaconda's] Carr Fork mine." The letter also stated: "Also there have been 
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negotiations between officials of Anaconda, your management and officials of Kennecott to agree on 
a three-party cross-stripping agreement which would allow Kennecott to expand the boundaries of 
its Bingham open-pit mine by stripping waste material and low-grade ore material from the surface 
of property of Anaconda and New Bingham Mary adjacent to the present boundaries of the Bingham 
pit" 
16 Based on the statements of Anaconda, the intent of the proposed lease was to allow 
Anaconda to mine ore from the Claims by underground mining methods, but was not intended to 
convey the right to strip waste material from the surface of the Claims for the purpose of obtaining 
access to ore on adjacent property 
17 As of April 30, 1979, Anaconda caused New Bingham Mary to enter into a mining 
lease ("Lease") with Anaconda under which Anaconda was permitted to perform underground mining 
operations on the Claims through facilities at Anaconda's underground Carr Fork Mine At the time 
the Lease was entered into, Anaconda was the majority and controlling shareholder of New Bingham 
Mary and owned approximately 86 6% of the issued and outstanding stock of New Bingham Mary 
The Lease provided the New Bingham Mary would receive from Anaconda minimum annual royalties 
of $25,000 per year to be credited against a three percent net smelter return production royalty 
18 The royalties payable to New Bingham Mary under the Lease were reasonable for the 
type of mining Anaconda intended to perform on the Claims, i e , underground mining There is no 
evidence that New Bingham Mary ever received payment for or consideration for the stripping rights 
to the Claims, which had separate value. 
19 At no time did Anaconda ever express the intent that the Lease was intended to 
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include the right to strip overburden or waste from the Claims or to mine the surface of the Claims 
20 Pursuant to the Lease, Anaconda mined ore from the Claims through facilities at 
Anaconda's underground Carr Fork Mine from August 1979 to November 1981 The Board of 
Directors of New Bingham Mary declared dividends on two occasions, once in 1982 and once in 
1985 Defendants received and accepted their share of the dividends knowing they represented 
royalties paid by Anaconda to New Bingham Mary in connection with Anaconda's activities under 
the 1979 Lease At no time did Anaconda conduct any surface mining activities on the Claims or 
strip any waste or overburden from the surface of the Claims Anaconda never performed any open-
pit or surface mining in the Bingham District 
21 Effective September 12,1985, Kennecott purchased Anaconda's assets located in and 
around the Oquirrh Mountains, Utah, including Anaconda's shares of New Bingham Mary stock 
22 Following Kennecott's purchase of Anaconda's assets, Kennecott was at all times 
New Bingham Mary's majority and controlling shareholder and controlled all aspects of New 
Bingham Mary's governance, assets and affairs From the time Kennecott purchased Anaconda's 
assets until the Merger, all of New Bingham Mary's officers and directors were officers, directors, 
or employees of Kennecott As such, a conflict of interest existed between Kennecott and its 
designated officers, directors and employees whom it caused to be elected as New Bingham Mary's 
officers and directors (on the one hand), and New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority 
shareholders (on the other hand) with respect to dealings in which the interests of Kennecott were 
adverse to the interests of New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders. 
23 The Lease provides in part that, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, 
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"Anaconda, or its successors, shall not assign this Mining Lease or any interest therein, and shall not 
sublet the Property or any part thereof, or any right or privilege appurtenant thereto, or suffer any 
other person to occupy or use the Property or any portion thereof without the prior written consent 
of Lessor, provided that such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld Any such assignment or 
subletting without such consent shall be void and shall, at the option of Lessor, terminate this Mining 
Lease " 
24 The Lease does not discuss the right to strip the surface of the Claims The terms of 
the Lease include the right to mine ore on the surface of the Claims (which necessarily involves the 
right to strip the surface to reach ore on the Claims), but do not grant a right to remove or strip 
overburden or waste from the Claims for the purpose of mining ore on adjacent property 
25 Anaconda's interest under the Lease was purportedly assigned to Kennecott on 
November 2, 1987. No written consent to the assignment was obtained prior to the assignment 
Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, the assignment was void, and New Bingham Mary had the right 
thereafter to terminate the Lease Kennecott thereafter recognized that the Lease provided that the 
purported assignment was void and that New Bingham Mary had the right thereafter to terminate the 
Lease, but Kennecott did not in fact cause New Bingham Mary to terminate the Lease Kennecott 
did not ever disclose to New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that the assignment was void 
and that New Bingham Mary had the right to terminate the Lease. Rather, Kennecott subsequently 
caused New Bingham Mary to provide New Bingham Mary's written consent to assignment of 
Anaconda's interest under the Lease to Kennecott on March 17, 1988. 
26 To ensure that New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders received fair value 
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for the right to strip the surface of the Claims, independent officers and directors of New Bingham 
Mary, acting in the best interests of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders, would have 
terminated the Lease after New Bingham Mary's written consent was not obtained prior to 
assignment to Kennecott of Anaconda's interest under the Lease 
27 At the time Kennecott caused New Bingham Mary to provide written consent to the 
assignment, Kennecott and New Bingham Mary's officers and directors knew the value of the right 
to strip the surface of the Claims and knew the Claims were in a critical location with respect to 
westward expansion of the Bingham Mine 
28 Neither Kennecott nor New Bingham Mary's officers or directors informed New 
Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that New Bingham Mary's prior written consent was not 
obtained before Anaconda's interest in the Lease was assigned to Kennecott, that assignment of the 
Lease was void, and New Bingham Mary had, but did not exercise, the right to terminate the Lease 
Defendants did not have notice prior to this litigation that New Bingham Mary' s prior written consent 
was not obtained before the lessee's interest in the Lease was assigned to Kennecott, the assignment 
was void, and New Bingham Mary had, but failed to exercise, the right to terminate the Lease 
29 Without ever describing its interpretation to the minority shareholders, Kennecott 
internally viewed the Lease and the assignment to include unlimited stripping rights to the Claims 
30 Kennecott began stripping waste from the surface of the Claims as part of its 
expansion of its Bingham Mine during 1989 and continued stripping waste from the Claims thereafter 
31 Kennecott and New Bingham Mary's officers and directors knew Kennecott had 
begun stripping the surface of the Claims, but did not disclose to New Bingham Mary's minority 
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shareholders that Kennecott was stripping waste from the surface of the Claims as part of an 
expansion of the Bingham Mine At a 1992 annual meeting of New Bingham Mary's shareholders, 
a director of New Bingham Mary who was also an officer and employee of Kennecott concealed the 
fact Kennecott had begun stripping the Claims and informed minority shareholders the Claims were 
located "above and around" the Bingham Mine At the time of the 1992 shareholder meeting, 
Kennecott had been stripping the surface of the Claims for three years, therefore the Claims were 
located within the Bingham Mine 
32 Kennecott conducted stripping activities on the Claims for approximately six years 
before mining ore from either of the Claims Kennecott began removing ore by surface mining from 
one of the Claims as part of its operation of the Bingham Mine during 1995 and continued to remove 
ore from that Claim in 1996 Kennecott never removed ore from the other Claim The predominant 
purpose of Kennecott's stripping activities on the Claims was to enable Kennecott to access ore on 
property adjacent to the Claims 
33. The minority shareholders, including Defendants, did not have notice that Kennecott 
had begun stripping the surface of the Claims and removing ore from the Claims before the Special 
Meeting of Shareholders of New Bingham Mary held November 12, 1997, at which shareholders 
were invited to vote for or against the Merger. 
34 Had the Lease been terminated, New Bingham Mary would have been entitled to 
negotiate a new lease on the Claims as of 1987. An arm's-length negotiation would have resulted 
in fair and reasonable compensation to New Bingham Mary for the value of stripping rights, the value 
of shallower, porphyry that can be mined using open-pit methods, and the value of deeper, skarn ore 
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that can be mined using underground mining methods 
35 Kennecott, as the majority and controlling shareholder of New Bingham Mary, and 
the officers and directors of New Bingham Mary caused the affairs of New Bingham Mary to be 
operated in a way that was to Kennecott's benefit and to the detriment of New Bingham Mary and 
New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders Kennecott and the officers and directors of New 
Bingham Mary 
a Failed to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders of the value of 
New Bingham Mary's assets, including the stripping rights held by New Bingham Mary, 
b Failed to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to consenting to the 
assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, 
c Failed to terminate the Lease when New Bingham Mary's prior written 
consent was not obtained before the assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease to 
Kennecott, 
d Failed to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that New 
Bingham Mary's prior written consent was not obtained before the purported assignment of 
the lessee's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, that the assignment of the Lease was void, and 
that New Bingham Mary had, but did not exercise, the right to terminate the Lease, 
e Failed to object to Kennecott stripping waste from the surface of the Claims 
beginning in 1989 and continuing thereafter because the assignment was void and the Lease 
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should have been terminated, 
f Concealed from New Bingham Mary7 s minority shareholders that Kennecott 
had begun stripping waste from the surface of the Claims beginning in 1989 and continuing 
thereafter, 
g Failed to object to Kennecott removing ore from the Claims beginning in 1995 
and continuing through 1996 because the assignment was void and the Lease should have 
been terminated, 
h Failed to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders Kennecott had 
begun stripping waste from the surface of the Claims during 1989 and continued to do so, and 
had begun removing ore from the claims during 1995 and continued to do so through 1996, 
l Failed to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to Kennecott's 
continuing and ongoing stripping of waste from the surface of, and mining ore from the 
surface of, the Claims, 
j Failed to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to the valuation of 
New Bingham Mary's assets and Shares for purposes of the Merger, and 
k Failed to seek or obtain an impartial and independent appraisal of New 
Bingham Mary's assets and Shares based on independent information and all elements of 
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value of New Bingham Mary's assets, including the deeper, skarn ore located within the 
Claims and the right to strip the surface of the Claims 
36 The foregoing acts and failures by Kennecott and New Bingham Mary's officers and 
directors constitute breaches of their respective fiduciary duties to New Bingham Mary and its 
minority shareholders to maximize the value of New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's assets 
for all shareholders, and the duty to act in a fair and responsible manner with respect to New Bingham 
Mary and its minority shareholders Kennecott's and New Bingham Mary's officers' and directors 
breaches of their fiduciary duties were continuing and ongoing until the Merger 
37 Prior to this litigation, the minority shareholders, including Defendants, were not 
informed by Kennecott or New Bingham Mary's officers or directors, did not know, did not have 
notice of, and had not discovered the value of New Bingham Mary's assets, including the stripping 
rights, that New Bingham Mary had not given its prior written consent to the assignment, that the 
assignment was void, that New Bingham Mary had—but did not exercise—the right to terminate the 
Lease, that Kennecott had begun removing and continued to remove waste from the Claims, that 
Kennecott had begun mining and continued to mine ore from the Claims, that New Bingham Mary's 
officers and directors did not seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the rights of 
New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to the value of the Claims, the 
assignment, Kennecott's stripping and mining activities on the Claims, or the Merger 
3 8 Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that New Bingham Mary's 
minority shareholders, including Defendants, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
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discovered, prior to this lawsuit, the breaches of fiduciary duties by Kennecott and New Bingham 
Mary's officers and directors Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that New 
Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including Defendants, lacked diligence or delayed 
unreasonably in asserting claims for breaches of fiduciary duties, and has not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence it was prejudiced by any such delay or lack of diligence Nor has 
Plaintiff shown by a preponderance of the evidence that by asserting the claims for breaches of 
fiduciary duties, Defendants are taking a position inconsistent with any prior act, statement, or 
admission by Defendants or other minority shareholder of New Bingham Mary Plaintiff has not 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, 
including Defendants, discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, prior 
to this lawsuit, grounds for objecting to acts and omissions by Kennecott or New Bingham Mary's 
officers or directors constituting breaches of their respective fiduciary duties 
39 The foregoing breaches of fiduciary duties by Kennecott and New Bingham Mary's 
officers and directors caused New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders to receive less than 
fair value for the assets of New Bingham Mary 
40 The assets of New Bingham Mary at the time of the Merger included New Bmgham 
Mary's claims for breaches of fiduciary duty against its officers, directors, and majority and 
controlling shareholder, Kennecott The value of such claims must be included in the fair value of 
the Shares as of the date of the Merger, and is at least equal to the value of the assets given up by the 
management of New Bingham Mary to Kennecott in transactions between New Bingham Mary and 
Kennecott that were not at arm's length That value is at least equal to the reasonable compensation 
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New Bingham Mary would have obtained for the stripping rights to the Claims and other assets in 
a transaction negotiated on an arm's length basis 
41 In the alternative, the value of the Shares at the time of the Merger included all the 
value of the Claims unencumbered by the Lease, which Lease should be disregarded as properly 
terminable as of 1987 That value is likewise at least equal to the reasonable compensation New 
Bingham Mary would have obtained for the stripping rights to the Claims and other assets in a 
transaction negotiated on an arm's length basis 
42 The appraisal of New Bingham Mary by Gerald P Halmbacher presented by Plaintiff 
at trial was not independent and was based on information provided by Kennecott that could only lead 
to a determination that was unfairly favorable to Kennecott and the Plaintiff and unfavorable to the 
minority shareholders Plaintiffs appraisal does not reflect the fair value of New Bingham Mary's 
assets or the Shares 
43 The expertise and qualifications of Defendants' expert witnesses, Bernard J Guarnera 
and Donald P Bellum, in evaluating the technical and appraisal matters about which each testified 
is unquestionable by reason of their respective skills, backgrounds, education, and experience in the 
mining industry, appraising mining properties, managing and operating mining companies and mining 
operations, and negotiating acquisitions and sales of mining properties The Court finds their 
testimony and expert opinions were based on thorough analysis of all of the factors relevant to the 
analyses they performed and correctly applied those factors to the income and market approaches 
they used to value the assets of New Bingham Mary The Court finds the testimony of Mr Guarnera 
and Mr Bellum was reliable, helpful, and persuasive in determining the fair value of the Claims and 
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the Shares 
44 The Court adopts the appraisals and methodology of Mr Guarnera and Mr Bellum 
with respect to the fair value of the Claims and the Shares as follows 
a The Court adopts the Defendants' experts' opinions concerning the technical 
and economic factors relevant to determining the fair value of New Bingham Mary's assets 
as of December 31, 1997, including commodity prices, discount rates, and tax basis The 
Court finds those opinions are based on reliable data correctly applied to appropriate 
valuation and appraisal methods 
b The Court adopts the Defendants' experts' opinion that a five percent net 
smelter returns royalty rate reflects the fair royalty rate reflective of the market at all relevant 
times that results in fair value being given for the ore located within the Claims From 1987 
and thereafter, parties negotiating at arm's length, acting m their own respective best 
interests, would negotiate a five percent net smelter return royalty rate for the ore located 
within the Claims 
c Based on a five percent net smelter return royalty rate, the net present value 
of the shallower, porphyry ore located within the Claims is $2,385,745 ($1,368,605 net 
present value of royalties at 3% royalty rate contained in the report of Defendants' experts 
times 5/3 = $2,281,008 plus $104,737 net present terminal value of Lease = $2,385,745) as 
of December 31, 1997 
d The Court adopts the Defendants' experts' opinion that the fair value of the 
Shares of New Bingham Mary includes additional value for the deeper, skarn ore located 
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within the Claims The Court finds that known skarn mineralization lies within the Claims and 
that a prudent person would ascribe a value of $13 3 million to the known skarn 
mineralization located within the Claims Based on the royalty rate of five percent, $66S,000 
of that amount ($13 3 mdhon times 0 05 = $665,000) is ascribed to the value of New 
Bingham Mary as of December 31, 1997 
e One method of determining the fair value of the right to strip the surface of 
the Claims is to determine what portion of the net cash flow (derived from the value of ore 
made available by having the right to strip the surface of the Claims) a prudent buyer acting 
in its own best interests would pay and a prudent seller acting in its own best interests would 
accept in exchange for the stripping rights 
f The right to strip the surface of the Claims controlled access to ore reasonably 
projected by the income method of valuation to generate more than $3 billion in gross 
revenues and more than $762 million in net cash flows with a net present value of more than 
$238 million as of December 31, 1997 
g The Court finds a prudent buyer acting in its own best interests would pay, and 
a prudent seller acting in its own best interests would accept, fifteen percent of the net present 
value of $238 million, or $35,700,000 
h Alternatively, the fair value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims may 
be determined by the royalty rate a prudent buyer would pay and a prudent seller would 
accept on ore made available by having the right to strip the surface of the Claims The Court 
finds a prudent buyer would pay, and a prudent seller would accept, a net smelter returns 
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royalty of two percent on the ore made available by having the right to strip the surface of the 
Claims A two percent net smelter return royalty on all ore made available by obtaining the 
right to strip the surface of the Claims would generate income for New Bingham Mary with 
a net present value of $30,534,341 as of December 31,1997 Forty percent of the net present 
value of royalties derived from ore located within the Claims (2%/5%) is subtracted from this 
number to avoid double counting royalties derived from ore located within the Claims Thus, 
the net present value of the stripping rights based on royalties is $29,580,043 ($30,534,341 
minus forty percent of $2,385,745 = $29,580,043) as of December 31, 1997 
l The Court finds both methods of valuing the stripping rights valid and relevant, 
and adopts the average of the two methods, $32,640,000 or $33 61 per Share of New 
Bingham Mary, as the fair value of the stripping rights as of December 31,1997 The value 
of the stripping rights is in addition to and independent of the value of the ore located within 
the Claims 
j The Court finds New Bingham Mary held $348,900 in cash assets as of 
December 31, 1997, all of which is included in the value of New Bingham Maty 
45 In summary, the Court finds the value of New Bingham Mary as of December 31, 
1997, is as follows 
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Net Value Value per Share1 
Cash $348,900 $0 36 
Value of deep skarn 
mineralization located 
within the Claims $665,000 $0 68 
Value of shallow porphyry 
mineralization located 
within the Claims $2,385,745 $2 46 
Value of stripping rights $32,640,000 $33 61 
Total fair value of Shares $36,039,645 $37 11 
46 The fair value of the Shares, and the amount that must be paid pursuant to the Merger, 
is $37 11 per Share The Defendants were already paid on the basis of $1 10 per Share The 
Additional amount per Share that must be paid to Defendants pursuant to the Merger is $36 01 per 
Share, the difference between the fair value of the Shares and the amount already paid for the shares 
($37 11 per Share - $1 10 per Share = $36 01 per Share) 
47 Defendants are entitled to a total award (representing the fair value of all of the Shares 
as of December 31, 1997) in the amount of $1,325,204 00 ($36 01 per Share times 36,801 Shares 
= $1,325,204 00) The calculation of prejudgement interest at the legal rate often percent per year 
from February 18, 1998, the date that Defendants were paid on the basis of $1 10 per Share, to 
January 13, 2004, equals $781,870 36 ($1,325,204 00 times 0 10/year times 5 90 years = 
$781,870 36) The total amount to which the Defendants are entitled through January 13, 2004, 
Value per Share = Net Value divided by 971.200 New Bingham Mary Shares issued and outstanding as 
of December 31, 2997 
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equals $2,107,074 36 and is summarized as follows 
Prejudgment 
Shares Judgment Interest Total 
Marilyn Groesbeck 
Glade 14,720 $530,067 20 $312,739 64 $842,806 84 
Robert Groesbeck 14,721 $530,103 21 $312,760 89 $842,864 10 
Robert R Groesbeck 
Living Trust 7,360 $265,033 60 $156,369 82 $421,403 42 
48 The Court finds in all respects as set forth and implied by the following Conclusions 
of Law 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
49 The court concludes in all respects as set forth and implied by the foregoing Findings 
of Fact 
50 Defendants dissented from the Merger and Defendants properly perfected their 
dissenter's rights Defendants complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann § 16-10a-1330 et 
seq and are entitled to an award equal to the fair value of their Shares 
51 Extrinsic evidence concerning the intent of the parties to the Lease is admissible to 
allow the Court to determine whether the Lease is ambiguous and, if so, to interpret the Lease 
Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants' Trial Exhibits 108, 125, and 128 are therefore overruled, and 
each of those Exhibits are admitted into evidence In addition, Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to 
Exclude the Introduction of Evidence to Interpret the 1979 Lease is denied 
52 Breaches of fiduciary duty that affect the fair value of New Bingham Mary's assets 
are relevant to determination of the fair value of the Shares to the extent the statute of limitations on 
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those breaches has not run Plaintiff s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Unrelated to the Merger is therefore denied, and such evidence is admitted into evidence 
53 The value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims is relevant to determining the 
fair value of New Bingham Mary's assets and the Shares Plaintiffs objection to admission of 
evidence concerning the fair value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims is therefore denied. 
54 New Bingham Mary's majority shareholder, officers, and directors owed New 
Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including Defendants, fiduciary 
duties to maximize the value of New Bingham Mary for all shareholders, and the duty to act in a fair 
and responsible manner with respect to New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders 
55 A conflict of interest existed between New Bingham Mary's majority and controlling 
shareholder and the controlling shareholder's designated officers and employees whom it caused to 
be elected as New Bingham Mary's officers and directors (on the one hand), and New Bingham Mary 
and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders (on the other hand) with respect to dealings in which 
the interests of Kennecott were adverse to the interests of New Bingham Mary and New Bingham 
Mary's minority shareholders Those transactions include consenting to the assignment of 
Anaconda's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, Kennecott's stripping waste from the surface of the 
Claims, Kennecott's mining ore from the Claims, determination of the consideration to be paid to 
New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders pursuant to the Merger, and keeping New Bingham 
Mary's minority shareholders informed of New Bingham Mary's dealings with Kennecott The 
actions and omissions of New Bingham Mary's officers and directors with respect to New Bingham 
Mary's dealings with Kennecott are not protected by the business judgment rule but instead are 
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judged by the Court on the basis of their fairness to New Bingham Mary and the minority 
shareholders 
56 New Bingham Mary's majority shareholder, officers, and directors breached their 
fiduciary duties to New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including 
Defendants, by: 
a. Failing to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders of the value of 
New Bingham Mary's assets, including the stripping rights held by New Bingham Mary; 
b. Failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent and disinterested directors, or independent and 
disinterested legal counsel to protect the rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority 
shareholders with respect to consenting to the assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease 
to Kennecott; 
c. Failing to terminate the Lease when New Bingham Mary's prior written 
consent was not obtained before the assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease to 
Kennecott; 
d. Failing to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that New 
Bingham Mary's prior written consent was not obtained before the purported assignment of 
the lessee's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, that the assignment was void, and that New 
Bingham Mary had, but failed to exercise, the right to terminate the Lease; 
e. Failing to object to Kennecott stripping waste from the surface of the Claims 
beginning in 1989 and continuing thereafter because the assignment was void and the Lease 
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should have been terminated, 
f Concealing from New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that Kennecott 
had begun stripping waste from the surface of the Claims beginning in 1989 and continuing 
thereafter, 
g Failing to object to Kennecott removing ore from the Claims beginning in 1995 
and continuing through 1996 because the assignment was void and the Lease should have 
been terminated, 
h Failing to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders Kennecott had 
begun stripping waste from the surface of the Claims during 1989 and continued to do so, and 
had begun removing ore from the claims during 1995 and continued to do so through 1996 
l Failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to Kennecott's 
continuing and ongoing stripping of waste from the surface of, and mining ore from the 
surface of, the Claims, 
j Failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to the valuation of 
New Bingham Mary's assets and Shares for purposes of the Merger, and 
k Failing to seek or obtain an impartial and independent appraisal of New 
Bingham Mary's assets and Shares based on independent information and all elements of 
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Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including Defendants, discovered, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have discovered, prior to this lawsuit, grounds for objecting to acts and 
omissions by Kennecott or New Bingham Mary's officers or directors constituting breaches of their 
respective fiduciary duties Plaintiffs affirmative defense with respect to laches and estoppel are 
denied 
60 Defendants are entitled to judgment in the amount of $1,325,204 00 ($36 01 per Share 
times 36,801 Shares = $1,325,204 00) In addition, Defendants are entitled to prejudgment interest 
at the legal rate often percent per year from February 18, 1998, the date that Defendants were paid 
on the basis of $1 10 per Share Interest from February 18, 1998, to January 13, 2004, equals 
$781,870 36 ($1,325,204 00 times 0 10/year times 5 90 years - $781,870 36) Defendants are 
therefore entitled to judgment in the amount of $2,107,074 36 as follows 
Prejudgment 
Shares Judgment Interest Total 
Marilyn Groesbeck 
Glade 14,720 $530,067 20 $312,739 64 $842,806 84 
Robert Groesbeck 14,721 $530,103 21 $312,760 89 $842,864 10 
Robert R Groesbeck 
Living Trust 7,360 $265,033 60 $156,369 82 $421,403 42 
61 In addition, Defendants are entitled to interest at the rate of $3,630 70 per day from 
January 14, 2004, until the date the Judgment is signed as follows Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, 
$1,452 24 per day, Robert Groesbeck, $1,452 34 per day, and Robert R Groesbeck Living Trust, 
$726 12 per day In addition, Each Defendant is entitled to interest at the judgment rate of 3 41 
percent per year or as that rate may change from time to time from the date the Judgment is signed 
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DATED this iS> day of 
Stephen L Henrioc 
Distnct Court Juds 
67616 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of January 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be served via hand delivery, on 
the following 
JohnB Wilson 
Margaret Niver McGann 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Hius/Mi ^ ^^f^yu^xui 
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Tab 5 
NOTICE OF MINING LEASE . f I ,'^  .^ .: T . 
JU^JU This Memorandum and Notice of Mining Lease*, dated 
d 14/£ /C 
this SZp day of April, 1979, by and between New Bingham- <-
Mary Mining Company, a Utah corporation, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Lessor" and The Anaconda Company, a Delaware 
corporation, hereinafter referred to £s "Anaconda"; 
W I T N E S S E T H 
In consideration of the terms and provisions set 
forth in that certain Mining Lease dated on even date here-
with,, hereinafter called the "Mining Lease", between Lessor 
and Anaconda. Lessor has leased and does hereby lease unto 
Anaconda, for the purposes therein specified, the following 
patented mining claims, herein called the ".Mining Properties", 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
]0. COMMONWEALTH Lode Lot No. 418, and 
'"' MARY Lode, Lot No. 418, both situated in the 
West Mountain Mining District, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah. 
Together with all minerals, water and water 
rights, rights-of-way, easements, tenements, hereditaments, 
privileges, appurtenances and appropriations of every kind 
and nature belonging to Lessor and located on or in the 
vicinity of or in anywise pertaining to the mining properties. 
CO 
T h e p r i m a r y t e r m of s a i d M i n i n g L e a s e i s 25 y e a r s (<§ 
J. rora t h e d a t e h e r e o f , s u b j e c t t o r e n e w a l a s p r o v i d e d i n Co 
S e c t i o n 2 . 2 o f t h e M i n i n g L e a s e . Apr.,' ~-° ~->H U3 
+- ? 
Information regarding the terms of said mining 
lease may be obtained from the President, New Bingham-Mary 
Mining Company, 555 Seventeenth Street, Denver, Colorado 
80217. 
It is understood that the Mining Lease constitutes 
the complete agreement between Lessor and Anaconda with, 
respect to the Mining Properties. This notice of mining 
lease shall not be deemed to modify any other provisions of 
the Mining Lease, hereby ratifying and affirming the Mining 
Lease and all of its terms. 
In witness whereof, the parties hereto have executed 
this Notice of Mining Lease as of the date first above 
written. 
New Bingham-Mary Mining Company 
By _ 
President^--
The Anaconda Company 
By 
VicerPresident 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) 
County of Denver ) 
s s . 
The foregoing ins t rument was acknowledged before 
, ^ e on t h i s J f 7 ^ day of S?/>iJt 1979, by J . J . O 'Br ien , 
..•President of the New Binghafa-Mary Mining Company. 
• •. * *. 
""••:.f/'- "Witness my hand and o f f i c i a l s e a l . 
. y • • . . . 
^ j 
Notary P u b l i c 
Residing a t 
-t/v< My Commission Exp i r e s 
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STATE OF COLORADO ) 
County of Denver 
) ss, 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before 
me on this 3f *~_ day of CL/^LJ/ , 1979, by^lI^L y, 
~*~^foz<^ JC^->^C^L-S^ Vice-President of The Anaconda Company. 
Witness my hand and official seal. 
Notary Publ:' 
Residing at A/<£'. 
My Commission Expires 
° f B L 1 C / 




NEW BINGHAM-M^RY MINING COMPANY, Lessor 
THE ANACONDA COMPANY, Lessee 
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MINING LEASE 
THIS MINING LEASE dated the 3D day of 
197^, between NEW BINGHAM-MARY MINING COMPANY, a Utah corpo-
ration, hereinafter referred to as "Lessor", and THE 
ANACONDA COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Anaconda"; 
WITNESSETH: 
In consideration of the*sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) 
and other good and valuable consideration paid by Anaconda 
to Lessor, and in consideration of the covenants and agree-
ments hereinafter set forth, the parties agree as follows: 
I. GRANT OF LEASE 
1.1 Lessor hereby demises and leases unto Ana-
conda these patented mining claims situated in the West 
Mountain Mining District, Salt Lake County, Utah, which are 
more particularly described as the Mary Lode, Lot No. 415, 
and the Commonwealth Lode, Lot No. 418, together with all 
minerals, dumps, .improvements, fixtures and equipment, water 
and vfeter rights, and other privileges and appurtenances 
belonging to or situated upon such claims. All such lands, 
fixtures, equipment and interests in such lands are referred 
to herein as the "Property". 
II. TERM OF LEASE 
2.1 The primary term of the Lease hereunder is a 
period of twenty-five (25) years, commencing on the date 
hereof and ending on the anniversary date twenty-five (25) 
years later unless sooner terminated or extended as herein 
provided. 
2.2 Anaconda is hereby granted the option to ex-
tend this Mining Lease for five successive ten (10) year ex-
tensions by giving written notice to Lessor at least six (6) 
months'prior to the end of the primary or any extended lease 
term. 
III. RIGHTS GRANTED 
3.1 Lessor hereby grants to Anaconda during the 
term hereof the exclusive right, subject to the terms hereof: 
(a) to enter upon, explore, examine and in-
vestigate the Property, to carry on geologi-
cal and geophysical work with respect thereto, 
and to delineate ore occurrences, and to 
secure cores and samples from the Property; 
(b) to develop, extract, taJce, mine, save 
and sell minerals from the Property, and to 
engage in related operations with respect to 
all veins, lodes and mineral deposits con-
tained in or on the Property, to construct 
and maintain on the Property all works and 
buildings and other structures, machinery and 
facilities necessary for such mining and 
related operations; 
(c) to the extent Lessor has such rights, to 
have free access to and from all areas of the 
Property, and to use Lessor1s fixtures and 
equipment located on the Property as of the 
effective date of this Mining Lease; and 
(d) to possess, occupy and use, in the 
course of and pertinent to its operations 
upon or within the Property, any presently 
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existing shaft, tunnel, drift, winze, adit or 
other mine workings, owned by Lessor and 
situated on the Property. 
IV. MINIMUM ROYALTY AND ROYALTIES RESERVED 
4.1 Anaconda shall pay to Lessor Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000) upon execution of this Mining Lease and a 
minimum advance annual royalty of Twenty-Five Thousand 
Dollars ($25,000) payable within ten days after approval of 
this Mining Lease by the stockholders of Lessor, which will 
be the effective date of this Mining Lease, and on each 
anniversary of the effective date for the remaining period 
during which this Lease is in effect. These minimum advance 
royalty payments shall be a credit against production royal-
ties in excess of said advance minimum royalty payments that 
accrje in accordance with the royalty schedule set forth 
herein. 
4.2 Lessor reserves a royalty of Three Percent 
(3%) of Net Returns, as hereinafter defined, on all minerals 
and products removed from the Property. 
4.3 The term "Net Returns" when used herein shall 
mean the total purchase price payable by the purchaser which 
purchases from Anaconda (including purchases by other divisions 
of The Anaconda Company) ore mined from the Property, con-
centrate, metal, metal products or other salable products 
produced therefrom, after deducting therefrom all costs and 
charges incurred by Anaconda prior to the sale (excepting, 
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however, the direct costs of mining and concentrating said 
ores), including, without limitation, smelter treatment 
charges, penalties, sampling and assaying charges paid by 
Anaconda or deducted by the purchaser with relation to said 
ore or concentrates, and all haulage charges incurred by 
Anaconda from the concentrator to the point of delivery to 
the purchaser of the product so sold, or freight and haulage 
charges from the Property to a purchaser of direct smelting 
ore, and costs and charges for refining of the salable 
product. 
4.4 Royalties payable to Lessor on Net Returns 
received by Anaconda shall be paid by Anaconda within 30 
days following the close of each calendar quarter. Each 
royalty payment shall be accompanied by copies of the assay 
reports and settlement sheets or other appropriate records 
of Net Returns received by Anaconda from the purchaser of 
such ore, concentrate, metal, metal product or other salable 
product with relation to all production to which such 
royalty payment relates. 
4.5 In the event that the smelter treatment 
charges, penalties, sampling and assaying charges, and rail 
freight or other haulage charges, and refining charges 
deductible with relation to a particular lot of ore or 
concentrate or products produced therefrom should exceed 
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the purchase price payable by the purchaser with relation to 
said lot of ore, Anaconda shall pay the amount of said 
deficiency and shall not be entitled to deduct the amount so 
paid from Net Returns applicable to any other/-lot of ore or 
concentrate sold. 
4.6 In the event the smelter or other reduction 
works to which the ores, minerals, concentrates, and other 
products are delivered or the refining facilities are owned 
or operated by Anaconda, and/or in the event Anaconda owns 
or operates the means for transportation from the point of 
loading to the smelter, reduction works, or refinery facil-
ities, Anaconda agrees that its charges shall be its actual 
cost of operating such facility. 
4.7 Lessor is hereby granted a security interest 
in all ores extracted from the Property and concentrates 
produced therefrom, including proceeds from the sale there-
of, during the term of this Mining Lease or any extension 
thereof, to secure to Lessor any and all sums owing to 
Lessor by Anaconda arising from operations under this Mining 
Lease, provided, however, that Lessor agrees to permit such 
security interest to be subordinated to a lien of a lending 
institution which provides funds to Anaconda. 
V. MINING OPERATIONS 
5.1 Anaconda shall conduct all exploration, 
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development, mining, reclamation and other operations under 
this Mining Lease in accordance with good mining practices 
arid in accordance with sound principles of conservation, and 
all applicable laws, rules and regulations, including but 
not restricted to all applicable safety laws and environ-
mental laws and regulations of the United States and the 
State of Utah. 
5.2 Anaconda shall have the right to commingle 
ore mined from the Property with ore mined from other prop-
erties provided that Anaconda shall establish a system for 
establishing the amount and grade of ore from the Property 
which is being commingled, and resulting tons of concen-
trates, pounds of copper and ounces of silver and gold 
recovered from the concentrate, and provided that Lessor 
shall have the right to consent to and monitor the use of 
such system. 
5.3 Anaconda agrees that it will assume and dis-
charge all liability, claims and demands whatsoever arising 
out of or based upon or in connection with operations of 
Anaconda upon the Property. Anaconda further agrees to 
indemnify, defend and save Lessor and the Property harmless 
from and against any and all claims, demands or causes of 
action made by any person, firm or corporation on account of 
any debts, expenses or other claims incurred by Anaconda, 
its agents or employees. 
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VI. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY 
6.1 Anaconda shall comply with all state and 
federal social security and unemployment insurance laws. 
Before commencing activities on the Property, Anaconda shall 
be qualified under Workmen's Compensation Law of the State 
of Utah and shall at all times comply therewith. 
6.2 Anaconda agrees to and does hereby indemnify 
Lessor and save Lessor harmless against and from: 
(a) Any and all claims and liabilities, in-
cluding costs and expenses, for bodily injury 
to, or death of, persons (including claims 
and liabilities for care or loss of services 
in connection with any bodily injury or 
death); 
(b) Any and all claims and liabilities, in-
cluding costs and expenses, for loss or de-
struction of or damage to any property be-
longing to Anaconda or others (including 
claims or liabilities for loss of use of any 
property); and 
(c) Loss (including loss of use) or destruc-
tion of or damage to (i) material, supplies, 
equipment and other property necessary for 
the work, or (ii) any property of Lessor; 
resulting directly or indirectly from, or occurring in the 
course of the activities of Anaconda, its employees, agents, 
contractors or invitees, provided, however, that such in-
demnity in connection with this Mining Lease shall not 
extend to (i) claims and liabilities for injury or death to 
persons who are not employees of Anaconda, its agents or 
contractors, resulting from Lessor's sole negligence or 
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willful misconduct, or (ii) loss, destruction or damage 
(including claims and liabilities therefor) resulting from 
Lessor's sole negligence or willful misconduct. 
6.3 Anaconda will include the provisions of 
Paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 in any operating agreement or sub-
contract authorized by Article XV, and will require any 
parties working on or occupying the Property to comply with 
the provisions of this Article. Such inclusion shall not, 
however, relieve Anaconda from liability pursuant to said 
paragraph. 
VII. TITLE AND ACQUISITIONS 
7.1 This Mining Lease shall relate only to such 
interest as Lessor has in the Property. Lessor makes no 
warranties or representations, either expressed or implied, 
as to the condition of the Property, the quality, quantity 
or extent of ore, if any, thereon, the existence, adequacy 
or condition of machinery or equipment, or the sufficiency 
or extent of the rights or titles of Lessor with relation to 
the Property. Under no circumstances shall Lessor be obli-
gated or liable to Anaconda in the event that Anaconda is 
divested of any rights to the Property or any portion of the 
Property by persons claiming an interest therein, nor shall 
Lessor have any obligation to defend any action contesting 
the rights of Lessor or Anaconda to the Property. 
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7.2 Should Lessor hereafter acquire title or cure 
defects, if any, in the title to any of the Property exist-
ing at the time of the execution of this Mining Lease, such 
later acquired title shall become subject to this Mining 
Lease. 
7.3 Anaconda will pay Lessor the royalty set out 
in Paragraph 4.2 on all ore located within the vertical 
extension of the boundary of the Property, even though the 
apex of any lode, ledge, or vein of ore so situated may be 
located within the boundaries of property owned by Anaconda, 
Lessor waives all rights to any ore which is situated on the 
Anaconda side of the vertical extension of the common bound-
ary between Anaconda-owned properties and the Property, even 
though the apex of any lode, ledge or vein of ore so situ-
ated may be located within the boundaries of the Property. 
VIII. WATER RESOURCES 
8.1 Anaconda may use, in its operations under 
this Mining Lease, all water available from the Property 
after prior appropriations and existing contractual obli-
gations, if any, have been satisfied. 
IX. DEFAULT AND CANCELLATION 
9.1 This Mining Lease shall, at the option of 
Lessor, cease and terminate at the happening of any of the 
events specified in Paragraphs (a) through (h) of this Ar-
ticle, and Lessor may thereupon recover possession of the 
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Property, provided that written notice of intent to termi-
nate is given to Anaconda at least 90 days prior to the 
effective date of such termination, and all rights of Ana-
conda under this Mining Lease shall be deemed canceled and 
terminated. 
(a) If Anaconda makes an assignment for the 
benefit of its creditors; or 
(b) If a decree, mandate or other order by a 
court having jurisdiction is entered adjudg-
ing Anaconda a bankrupt or insolvent, and 
such decree, mandate or other order continues 
undischarged or unstayed for a period of 
ninety (90) days; or 
(c) If a decree, mandate or other order of a 
court having jurisdiction for the appointment 
of a receiver, liquidator, trustee or an as-
signee in bankruptcy or insolvency of Ana-
conda or if all or substantially all of 
Anaconda's property is entered, and such 
decree, mandate or other order remains in 
force undischarged and unstayed for a period 
of ninety (90) days; or 
(d) If Anaconda institutes proceedings for a 
decree, mandate or other order of any kind 
mentioned in the applicable provisions of the 
foregoing Paragraphs (b) or (c) , or in any 
such proceedings not instituted by Anaconda, 
files a consent to any such decree or order; 
or 
(e) If Anaconda admits in writing its in-
ability to pay its debts generally as they 
become due; or 
(f) If the interest of Anaconda in the Prop-
erty is sold under execution or other legal 
process; or 
(g) If Anaconda fails to pay part or all of 
the rentals or royalties set forth herein 
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when due, and such failure continues for 
thirty (30) days after written notice thereof 
from Lessor; or 
(h) If Anaconda fails to perform or observe 
any other covenant, agreement or requirement 
of this Mining Lease, and any such failure 
continues for thirty (30) days ''after written 
notice from Lessor specifying the nature and 
extent of any such default, unless such 
default is reasonably incurable within thirty 
(30) days (in which event Anaconda shall have 
commenced the curing of such default and 
shall thereafter proceed with all due dili-
gence to complete the curing of such de-
fault) . 
X. TERMINATION 
10.1 Anaconda may, at any time after one year from 
the date hereof, terminate this Mining Lease provided that 
written notice of intent to terminate is given Lessor at 
least 90 days prior to the effective date of such termination. 
10.2 On termination, all structures and mining im-
provements built or made by Anaconda on the Property shall 
be and become the property of Lessor. 
10.3 In the event of termination of this Mining 
Lease pursuant to Paragraph 10.1 hereof, Anaconda shall de-
liver4 to Lessor prior to the effective date of said termina-
tion a written release and quitclaim deed releasing all of 
the rights granted to and acquired by Anaconda under this 
Mining Lease and quitclaiming to Lessor all of the rights, 
titles and interests of Anaconda in and to the Property. 
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10.4 Termination of this Mining Lease, whether 
pursuant to this Article X or otherwise, shall not be deemed 
to terminate any obligations of Anaconda hereunder which 
have accrued prior to the date of such termination, nor 
shall it terminate the obligation of Anaconda to make roy-
alty payments with relation to all ore mined from the Prop-
erty, or concentrates produced therefrom, which have been 
removed from the Property prior to the effective date of 
such termination. All payments made by Anaconda to Lessor 
prior to the date of termination shall be retained by Lessor 
as compensation for rental and use of the Property and as 
the consideration for which the Mining Lease herein is 
given 
10.5 In the event of termination of the Mining 
Lease nerein, for any reason whatsoever, Anaconda agrees 
that it will voluntarily surrender the Property and all mine 
workings thereon to Lessor. In the event of such termina-
tion, Anaconda shall not be entitled to remove from the 
Property any timbering, roof support or other materials 
necessary to the physical support of the mine workings or 
the Property. Except as aforesaid, Anaconda shall have the 
right at any time during a period of 120 days following the 
termination of this Mining Lease to remove from the Property 
all tools, equipment, machinery, supplies and other personal 
property which have been placed on the Property by Anaconda 
and which have not become affixed to the soil. Any such 
tools, equipment, machinery, supplies and personal property 
which shall remain on the Property following the expiration 
of said 120 day period shall be deemed to have been aban-
doned by Anaconda and shall be and become the property of 
Lessor. 
10.6 All broken ores on the surface or underground 
not shipped prior to termination may be removed by Anaconda 
within 120 days after termination and accounted for, as 
provided in this Mining Lease, as if shipped prior to termi-
nation. If not so removed within 120 days, such ores shall 
become the Property of Lessor. 
XI. TAXES 
11.1 Anaconda will pay all ad valorem, severance, 
occupation or franchise taxes hereafter levied against the 
Property, or levied for the privilege of conducting mining 
operations thereon; except, however, where ad valorem taj<es 
are based upon net annual proceeds of production, the obli-
gation to pay such taxes shall be divided between Anaconda 
and Lessor in direct proportion to the percentage of average 
Net Returns received by each. Anaconda will pay taxes 
levied or assessed hereafter upon all machinery, equipment, 
and other personal property and improvements in existence 
upon the Property. Anaconda further agrees that in the 
event that following termination of this Mining Lease 
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any taxes are levied or assessed against the Property or 
Lessor, which taxes result from or are attributable to the 
production and/or sale by Anaconda of ore mined from the 
Property or concentrates produced therefrom, Anaconda will 
make payment of said taxes when due. Anaconda agrees that 
it will deliver to Lessor the original or duplicate copies 
of receipts evidencing payment of all such taxes by Ana-
conda . 
XII. FORCE MAJEURE 
12.1 All obligations of Anaconda under this Mining 
Lease, with the exception of the obligation to pay royalties 
and taxes and to protect Lessor and the Property from liens 
and damages, shall be suspended while, but only so long as 
and to the extent that, Anaconda is prevented from complying 
with such obligations in whole or in part by strikes, lock-
outs, acts of God, unavoidable accidents, uncontrollable de-
lays in transportation, and any state or federal laws, regu-
lations or orders, or other matters beyond the reasonable 
control of Anaconda whether similar to the matters speci-
fied, or otherwise* Anaconda shall not be required against 
its will to adjust any labor dispute or question the va-
lidity of or refrain from judicially testing any federal or 
state law, order, regulation or rule. 
XIII. INSPECTION 
13.1 Lessor and its agents and representatives may 
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at all reasonable times enter upon the Property to ascertain 
whether Anaconda is complying with the terms and conditions 
of this Mining Lease. Lessor assumes all liability for its 
personnel, agents and representatives while they are on the 
Property, 
13.2 Lessor may map the geology and survey the 
mine workings and take such samples as it may desire on the 
tracts owned by it, provided that such actions of Lessor 
shall not interfere with Anaconda's raining activities. 
XIV. RECORDS AND REPORTS 
14.1 Anaconda will keep accurate records, maps, 
and books of account in accordance with Article IV and usual 
accounting practices covering all of its operations under 
this Mining Lease. Such records, maps and books of account 
relating to ore production, tonnage and income from sale of 
ore and related products, shall be open for inspection of 
Lessor or its agents at any reasonable time. Lessor may 
arrange for an independent audit of all records and books of 
the income account at Lessor's expense to verify the accu-
racy of Anaconda's accounting. 
14.2 Anaconda shall keep up-to-date engineering 
survey records and maps of all surface and underground work-
ing places including, but not limited to, shafts, drifts, 
crosscuts, laterals, raises, winzes and stopes. Such 
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records and maps shall be open for inspection of Lessor or 
its agents at any reasonable time. 
14.3 Anaconda will furnish Lessor quarterly pro-
gress and production reports, with maps showing the char-
acter and amount of work performed, including footage ad-
vance in all headings, concentration of ore by Anaconda 
during the preceding quarter, and the place or places where 
work was performed, and shall, if available, make available 
for Lessor's inspection all sample rejects, drill core and 
cuttings, sample data and metallurgical accounts, drill 
logs, and assays, geological and engineering maps in order 
that Lessor may be kept currently informed as to the char-
acter and amount of work performed. All drill hole cores 
must be preserved. Lessor reserves the right to make copies 
of all sample data, metallurgical accounts, drill logs, 
assays, engineering data, and geological data for Lessor's 
permanent record. 
XV. ASSIGNMENT, OPERATION AGREEMENTS AND SUBCONTRACTS 
15.1 Except as provided below, Anaconda, or its 
successors, shall not assign this Mining Lease or any in-
terest therein, and shall not sublet the Property or any 
part thereof, or any right or privilege appurtenant thereto, 
or suffer any other person to occupy or use the Property or 
any portion thereof without the prior written consent of 
Lessor, provided that such consent by Lessor shall not be 
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unreasonably withheld. Any such assignment or subletting 
without such consent shall be void and shall, at the option 
of Lessor, terminate this Mining Lease. Anaconda may sub-
lease the Property or assign this Mining Lease to a joint 
venture partnership in which Anaconda is a general partner, 
and continuing only so long as Anaconda is a general part-
ner, provided, however, that no such assignment or sublease 
shall relieve Anaconda of its obligations or liabilities 
hereunder. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply 
to any transfers from Anaconda to any wholly-owned subsid-
iary or to any parent company of Anaconda, provided, how-
ever, that no such transfer shall relieve Anaconda of its 
obligations or liabilities hereunder. 
15.2 Trust deeds, trust indentures, mortgages, 
security agreements or other instruments executed for secu-
rity involving the Property are transfers within the meaning 
of Paragraph 15.1 and shall require the approval of Lessor. 
15.3 Anaconda may enter into an agreement or 
agreements not inconsistent with the terms of this Mining 
Lease with substantial and reliable operating companies or 
individuals for the performance of the work to be done on 
the Property. In any such agreement or agreements, Anaconda 
shall include an insurance and indemnity provision identical 
to that contained in Article VI of this Mining Lease, and 
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all such companies or individuals will be required to comply 
with the terms and conditions thereof and hereof. 
X V I
• POSTING, PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND 
ANACONDA AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
16.1 Anaconda shall post and keep pdsted on the 
Property such notices as may be necessary to adequately 
notify all persons who come upon the Property that it is 
held by Anaconda under lease from Lessor, and that .Anaconda 
is liable for due compensation of all labor employed and the 
cost of all supplies and materials purchased and used by 
Anaconda in and upon the Property, and that Anaconda, not 
Lessor, is responsible for any debts and expenses incurred 
by Anaconda in mining operations wi.hin the Property. 
16.2 Anaconda shall pay for all labor, power, 
tools, equipment, powder, timber and other materials and 
supplies used by Anaconda in the prosecution of work under 
this Mining Lease, and shall not allow any claijn or lien for 
any such thing to be made or asserted against the Property 
or against Lessor. 
16.3 All operations of Anaconda and its employees 
or agents under this Mining Lease shall be as independent 
contractors, and Anaconda and its employees or agents are 
not employees or agents of Lessor. 
X V I I
« INSTRUMENT FOR RECORDING AND RELEASE 
17.1 The parties shall execute for recording pur-
.1 Q _ 
poses a Notice of Lease of the same date as this Mining 
Lease, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and shall 
cause such Notice to be recorded on the records of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
XVIII. OCCUPATION OF LEASED PREMISES 
18.1 Anaconda acknowledges that it has made a 
physical inspection of the Property, including underground 
workings and all other property, including equipment and 
machinery, and is familiar with the condition of same and 
accepts said Property and equipment in their present condi-
tion. 
XIX. SURRENDER OF POSSESSION 
19.1 Anaconda shall on or before the last day of 
he term hereby granted, or of any extended term, or upon 
the sooner termination of this Mining Lease due to default 
or other reason, subject to the provisions of Article IX 
and X hereof, peaceably and quietly leave, surrender all 
right, title and interest, and yield up unto Lessor all and 
singular the Property, together with all alterations, addi-
tions and replacements thereon, free of subtenancies, liens, 
encumbrances and in good order and condition, except for 
reasonable wear and tear thereof. 
19.2 Within six (6) months after the expiration or 
termination of this Mining Lease, Anaconda shall deliver to 
Lessor all records of production, assays, maps and sections, 
further acts and thincs as raay be necessary to carry out the 
intent of this Mining Lease fully and effectually. 
XXIII. GOVERNING LAW 
23.1 This Mining Lease shall be construed accord-
ing to the laws of the State of Utah. 
XXIV. INTEGRATION AND STOCKHOLDER APPROVAL 
24.1 This Mining Lease, together with exhibits 
identified herein and attached hereto, constitutes the whole 
agreement between the parties. There are no terms, obliga-
tions, covenants or conditions other than contained in this 
Mining Lease. No variation of this Mining Lease shall be 
valid unless executed in writing by the parties. 
24.2 This Mining Lease and the lease granted 
hereby is subject to and conditional upon the authorization 
by a irnjority vote of the stockholders of Lessor at a stock-
holders1 meeting called pursuant to and as required by 
Section 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have exe-
cuted this Mining Lease as of the date first above written. 
NEW BINGHAM-MARY MINING COMPANY 
By 
I t s 
X 1- J&Z-L 
LESSOR 
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THE ANACONDA COMPANY 
^J^tkik^-
LESSEE 
O ' B r i e n , known 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
) s s . 
CITY AND COITNTY OF DENVER ) 
On t h i s JZ 7 ^ d a y o f £L/a^<Z£ 
b e f o r e me, a n o t a r y p u b l i c , a p p e a r e d J , J . 
me t o be t h e P r e s i d e n t of NEW BINGHAM-MARY MINING COMPANY 
t h a t e x e c u t e d t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t and a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me 
t h a t s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n e x e c u t e d t h e s a m e . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I h a v e h e r e u n t o s e t my h a n d 
and a f f i x e d my o f f i c i a l s e a l t h e day and y e a r i n t h i s c e r -
t i f i c a t e f i r s t a b o v e w r i t t e n . 
t o 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s : 
Uy co^mlislon expires September 224 198t 
Notary Public ^ 
Residing at <&Z^^T-C^S 
STATE.OF COLORADO 
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER 
On thisOo^2 day of 
1912./ before me, a notary publ: 
known to me to be the 
s s . 
appeared Arjrn«&nr^JL , / 
of The 
ANACONDA Company, t h a t executed the w i th in ins t rument and 
acknowledged t o me t h a t such c o r p o r a t i o n .executed the same, 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed my official seal the day and year in this cer-
tificate first above written. 
My Commission Expires: 
My Commission erp::es December 15, 1982 
^-/Vm^ Notary Public 
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